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History in the Making

Donald Rumsfeld (1932–2021)
By Devin Gillen and Levi Gonzalez

Figure 1. Donald Rumsfeld (1932–2021) shaking hands with Saddam Hussein
(1937–2006) in Baghdad on December 20, 1983. Courtesy of Wikimedia
Commons.1

“War Criminal Found Dead at 88: The Human and
Economic Costs of Donald Rumsfeld’s Wars are
Staggering.”
-

Phyllis Bennis, The Nation, July 1, 2021.2

On June 29, 2021, Donald Henry Rumsfeld (1932–2021), a
monumental American statesman, died at the age of 88 in Taos,
1

Iraqi State Television, “Shaking Hands: Iraqi President Saddam Hussein greets
Donald Rumsfeld, then special envoy of President Ronald Reagan, in Baghdad
on December 20, 1983,” Wikimedia Commons, public domain,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Saddam_rumsfeld.jpg.
2
Phylis Bennis, “War Criminal Found Dead at 88,” The Nation, July 1, 2021,
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/donald-rumsfeld-obit/.

267

In Memoriam

New Mexico.3 Throughout his life, Rumsfeld played a role in some
of the most significant episodes of the last half-century of
American political history, including, but not limited to, the
Vietnam War (1955–1975), the Watergate scandal (1972–1974),
ratcheting up relations with the Soviet Union, United States
relations with Iraq and Saddam Hussein (1936–2006), the
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon, the United States-led War on Terror (2001–present), and
the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandals (2003 –2004), to name a
few. Throughout his long life—stretching from the Great
Depression (1929–1939) to the COVID-19 pandemic (2019–
present)—Rumsfeld served as an agent of neoliberalism,
neoconservatism, and as an embodiment of the arrogance of
American exceptionalism. First serving as a flight instructor in the
Navy (1954–1957), then as an Illinois Congressman from 1963 to
1969, Rumsfeld filled various positions throughout the Richard
Nixon administration (1969–1974), Gerald Ford administration
(1974–1977), Ronald Reagan administration (1981–1989), and the
George W. Bush administration (2001–2009), culminating in his
role as the Secretary of Defense (for the second time). As Secretary
of Defense, from 2001 to 2006, Rumsfeld was responsible for
oversight of The War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan until his
resignation in 2006.
By examining Rumsfeld’s life and role in transforming
American foreign relations and economic policy, as well as the
ideological movements and developments he aligned himself with,
the dark realities of a long history of American exceptionalism are
laid bare. Rumsfeld’s early identification with the business
community eventually syncretized with the burgeoning school of
economic principles later codified as neoliberalism around the
1980s. By the end of Rumsfeld’s tenure in office in 2006,
neoliberal deregulation and privatization were the norms of the
day, entailing financial enrichment for himself and the Military3

Stephen Collinson & Paul LeBlanc, “Donald Rumsfeld, former secretary of
defense, dies at 88,” CNN, June 30, 2021,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/30/politics/donald-rumsfeld-dead/index.html.
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Industrial Complex (MIC). The widespread and indiscriminate use
of torture, approved by Rumsfeld himself (later to be denied, then
praised by Rumsfeld), also became the norm, along with the mass
murder, maiming, and displacement of millions in the disastrous
War on Terror throughout the Middle East and Africa.4 These
disasters were the culmination of a lengthy career of bellicose fearmongering and media and information manipulation by Rumsfeld
and his neoconservative allies. Rumsfeld played a leading role in
the political trickery, subterfuge, and manipulation of information
throughout his career. In the latter post-war years, neoconservatism
was rebranded as an aggressive and manipulative United States
foreign policy that worked in service of United States business
interests that existed before Rumsfeld, but he took up its reigns as
a leading supporter of the neoconservative cause.5 Rumsfeld and
the neoconservatives were not aberrations in the realm of United
States foreign policy, rather, they were leading figures of a new
expression and justification for a continued United States military
presence across the globe and further intervention in foreign
nations.
By the time Rumsfeld left office permanently in 2006, a
bipartisan consensus formed on the grander schemes set forth by
neoliberal advocates (like Rumsfeld and Milton Friedman [1912–
2006], American economist and statistician) and the hyperaggressive role of the United States in the world, as proposed by
the neoconservatives like Rumsfeld. The War on Terror that
Rumsfeld helped orchestrate continued to spill across the
surrounding region after his resignation and continues to take lives
and hemorrhage money today.6 It is worth examining the life of
4

Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies, “The staggering death toll in Iraq,”
Salon, March 19, 2018, https://www.salon.com/2018/03/19/the-staggeringdeath-toll-in-iraq_partner/.
5
Allen Dulles (1893–1969) and John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) and their
policies were at the helm of United States foreign policy formulation during the
Eisenhower administration (1953–1961) which laid the groundwork for the later
neoconservatives and neoliberals like Rumsfeld.
6
The Cost of War Project at Brown University estimated that by the twentieth
anniversary of 9/11, the War on Terror claimed roughly 900,000 deaths (not
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Rumsfeld and his allies who orchestrated their suffering to
remember the thousands of innocent victims (past, present, and
future) who, unlike Rumsfeld, did not get to die peacefully in their
homes. Until his final days, Rumsfeld was able to falsely claim
that all of these episodes of militaristic adventurism were purely
motivated by innocent desires to promote democracy and freedom
around the world.7 By analyzing Rumsfeld’s life, political
ideology, and role in the United States government, the authors
aim to demonstrate that the innocent claims regarding the goals of
the United States’ foreign and economic policies are examples of
cognitive dissonance at best.

including those killed by disease, displacement, or loss of access to food or
clean drinking water), cost $8 trillion dollars, and continues in over eighty
countries As the authors will discuss in detail, differing methodologies and
terminologies produce figures (or death tolls) that drastically decrease the death
toll. For example, studies such as those by The Lancet Medical Journal place the
death toll at 600,000 in Iraq alone by 2006, with an additional 54,000 nonviolent war-related deaths. In 2015, United Kingdom government officials later
admitted that this was “likely to be right” and a report by Physicians for Social
Responsibility found it to be “more reliable than other mortality studies
conducted in Iraq. Just Foreign Policy’s “Iraqi Death Estimator” compiled data
from Iraq Body Count and adjusted it to the ratio of the discrepancy found in the
2006 Lancet study which brought the figure to 1.45 million before the project
was discontinued in September 2011. In 2018, Salon published a study by
Medea Benjamin (the co-founder of CODEPINK for Peace) using the 2006
Lancet study ratios, a variation on Just Foreign Policy’s 2007 methodology, and
contemporary data to bring the potential death total to 1.5 to 3.4 million by
2018. Benjamin and Davies, “The staggering death toll in Iraq;” “Costs of the
20-year war on terror: $8 trillion and 900,000 deaths,” Brown University,
September 1, 2021, https://www.brown.edu/news/2021-09-01/costsofwar.
7
“Donald Rumsfeld talks to Al Jazeera,” Al Jazeera English, October 5, 2011,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xosu94rPSmw.
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Origins of Rumsfeld and the Nuclear Age (1945–Present)
“I could feel that something terrible has happened. I saw it
in my parents’ faces and heard it in the tense voices
reporting the news of [Pearl Harbor].”
-

Donald Rumsfeld.8

“The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against
Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to
surrender.”
-

Admiral William Leahy (1875–1959).9

Donald Henry Rumsfeld was born on July 9, 1932, in Chicago,
Illinois, amid the Great Depression. According to Rumsfeld, this
day also happened to symbolize the depths of the Depression:
The Chicago Tribune noted grimly that the Dow
Jones Industrial Average had closed the day before
at 41.22—the lowest point recorded during the
Great Depression. This was the day I was born—on
what may well have been the bleakest day of the
cruelest year of the worst economic catastrophe in
American history.10

8

Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Penguin
Group, 2011), 38.
9
“The Key Reason Why America Refused Japan’s First Offer To Surrender,”
World War Wings, accessed May 21, 2022, https://worldwarwings.com/keyreason-america-refused-japans-first-offersurrender/#:~:text=The%20key%20reason%20why%20the%20Allied%20Force
s%20refused,the%20Emperor%20could%20be%20prosecuted%20for%20war%
20crimes.
10
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 40.

271

In Memoriam

Despite these conditions, Rumsfeld’s family managed to avoid the
worst economic consequences. His father, George Rumsfeld
(1904–1974), was a real estate broker and moved the family out of
Chicago into the suburbs to gain access to better schooling
facilities tied to higher property values.
Rumsfeld was nine years old when the United States
entered World War II (1939–1945) following the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor in December 1941. At this early age, Rumsfeld
claimed he had a vague idea of where Hawaii was but “didn’t
know anything about Pearl Harbor or what it meant to the United
States Navy. But [he] could feel that something terrible had
happened. [He] saw it in [his] parents’ faces and heard it in the
tense voices reporting the news of the attack.”11 Rumsfeld’s father
decided to enlist in the Navy after the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a
result, the family moved around the country staying where he was
stationed. The family made stops in North Carolina, Washington,
Oregon, and California. In his memoir, Rumsfeld reminisced
fondly of this time as he noted the “special bonds” he shared with
other kids who also had fathers serving in the war: “Everyone I
knew in [California] supported the war effort with a sense of
common purpose…there was a sense we were all in it together.”12
During this time, Rumsfeld also began to have the “aspiration” of
following in his father’s footsteps by becoming a “flying naval
officer.”13 Throughout the early years of Rumsfeld’s life, it is quite
apparent that he had tremendous pride in his father’s service and
also in what he perceived as his country’s service to the world as
he notes, “the fate of democracy now hung on America’s
success.”14
By August 1945, Rumsfeld just turned thirteen and, in a
massive show of force, the United States dropped two nuclear
bombs on an already defeated and inert Japan.15 It is traditionally
11

Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 38.
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 44.
13
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 45.
14
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 39.
15
“The Key Reason Why America Refused Japan’s First Offer To Surrender.”
12
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argued that the use of nuclear weapons was a necessary evil to
force the Japanese to surrender, yet Japan already attempted to
conditionally surrender to the United States, however, the United
States refused.16 Despite this, the myth that an unreasonable Japan
constituted an ever-looming threat that forced the United States to
use nuclear weapons took hold in the American conscience.
Rumsfeld himself furthered this narrative in his memoir.17 This
narrative, however, ignores the aforementioned attempted
surrender and the fact that the Japanese war machine, and
economy, had ground to a near-complete halt severely limiting
their combat capabilities and the threat they posed.18 If the Soviets
invaded, then “this Soviet ‘D-Day’ in Hokkaido would’ve been a
walkover—the Japanese army was in shambles, and Emperor
Hirohito [1901–1989] had recently proclaimed defeat.”19
Scholars such as Sergey Radchenko (b. 1950), a fellow at
the Wilson Center and Professor of International Politics at Cardiff
University, suppose the nuclear liquidation of 110,000 to 210,000
Japanese was a veiled threat directed toward the Soviet Union in
one of the opening salvos of the Cold War (1947–1991), during
which Rumsfeld became a crucial player.20 As Radchenko states,
Although the bomb did not make Stalin [1878–
1953] back off in Hokkaido [Japan], its implicit
threat made superpower cooperation an increasingly
16

“The Key Reason Why America Refused Japan’s First Offer To Surrender.”
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 46.
18
The Japanese were oil deficient and this greatly hindered their war effort and
planning throughout the war. In fact, Pearl Harbor was originally enacted in the
hopes that a crippled United States Navy would not be able to respond to Japan,
taking vital oil reserves in the East Indies to make up their already existing oil
deficit. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1990).
19
Sergey Radchenko, “Did Hiroshima Save Japan From Soviet Occupation?,”
Wilson Center, August 5, 2015,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/did-hiroshima-save-japan-sovietoccupation.
20
Radchenko, “Did Hiroshima Save Japan From Soviet Occupation?”
17
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remote prospect. Hiroshima, then, made the Cold
War practically inevitable... Although just months
earlier, the United States War Department had
considered letting the Soviets occupy Hokkaido and
even part of Honshu, Japan’s largest island,
Hiroshima had clearly changed things for [Harry S.]
Truman [1884–1972]. Possession of a mighty new
weapon gave Truman the confidence to set the
terms of his relationship with Stalin. On August 18,
Truman bluntly turned Uncle Joe down [on his
proposal to occupy Hokkaido].21
Whether the Soviet presence was a determining factor or not, the
United States supposedly refused the initial Japanese surrender
because it called for the Japanese emperor, Showa Hirohito, to
remain in power following the war, exempt from any form of war
crime tribunal. The United States later decided that Emperor
Hirohito could remain and that it would have been
counterproductive to remove him in the reconstruction process.
This rendered the motivating factor in the decision to nuke Japan
twice (to avoid accepting a conditional surrender that hinged on
retaining the emperor) completely unfounded, as was the other
mythical justification of a threatening Japanese presence.
Despite refusing to accept a conditional surrender from
Japan on the basis that it would infringe on the policy of nonconditional surrender and supposedly forcing the United States to
drop the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August
1945, preliminary negotiations over a conditional surrender of a
contingent of Nazi troops in Italy was conducted.22 When
examining the United States’ policies toward Nazi Germany, the
cynical nature of the excuse given to reject any conditional
21

Radchenko, “Did Hiroshima Save Japan From Soviet Occupation?”
The Allied forces consisted primarily of the United States, The United
Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, amongst others such as Canada and
Australia. The Axis forces consisted primarily of Nazi Germany and their
occupied territories, Japan, and Italy.

22

274

History in the Making

surrender by Japan is in full display. On March 8, 1945, Allen
Dulles (1893–1969), as an Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
operator, negotiated a potential early conditional surrender of Nazi
troops in Italy with ranking SS leader Karl Wolff (1900–1984).23
These discussions of a potential conditional Nazi surrender that
never came to fruition, named Operation Sunrise (1945), and the
later cooperation with Nazi scientists in Operation Paperclip
(1945–1949), demonstrate the United States’ lack of interest in
upholding the Allied policy of unconditional surrender that
supposedly prevented acceptance of the Japanese surrender. When
news of these discussions broke out amongst the Allied Powers,
the Soviet Union was enraged that the United States negotiated in
secret with the genocidal Nazi Germany that ultimately killed
some twenty-seven million Russians.24 In 1942, Wolff, a
cheerleader of the Holocaust and personal chief of staff for
Heinrich Himmler (1900–1945), a main architect of the Holocaust,
wrote of “his special joy that now five thousand of the Chosen
People are going to Treblinka every day.”25 Dulles later described
Wolff as “distinctive” and “dynamic.”26 This cooperation with a
former evil enemy to eliminate the new evil is later mirrored by the
23

The OSS was a precursor to the CIA. John Kenneth Galbraith, “Allen Dulles
Under the Harsh Light of History Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. By
Bradley F. Smith and Elena Agarossi. Basic Books. 234 pages. $11.95,” The
Washington Post, September 9, 1979,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/entertainment/books/1979/09/09/allen
-dulles-under-the-harsh-light-of-history-operation-sunrise-the-secret-surrenderby-bradley-f-smith-and-elena-agarossi-basic-books-234-pages-1195/385b6bff080c-4ba2-8e3d-dd554c13ef59/.
24
Compare this figure to the roughly three thousand killed in the September 11,
2001, attacks that Rumsfeld and then-President W. Bush (2001–2009) later used
to declare every nation was either with them (the United States) in the War on
Terror or against them and with the terrorists. The United States government
also used this figure as a justification for breaking international law by
launching legally dubious wars.
25
Galbraith, “Allen Dulles Under the Harsh Light of History Operation
Sunrise.”
26
Galbraith, “Allen Dulles Under the Harsh Light of History Operation
Sunrise.”
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neoconservatives, including Rumsfeld, in their later support for the
Mujahideen and Saddam Hussein, and then opposition to both
Saddam’s Iraq, and the offshoots of the original Mujahideen holy
warriors.
At the time, Rumsfeld thought little of the impact the
nuclear weapons had on the Japanese cities, let alone global
politics; he was just glad that it seemingly meant his father was
coming home.27 Coming of age through these world-shaking
events likely left a lasting impact on Rumsfeld’s psyche and
developing political ideology, as it did for most Americans
entering the Cold War. Rumsfeld’s career kept him continually
preoccupied with nuclear weaponry in his adult life.
Throughout his teenage years, Rumsfeld lived in and
attended schools in the affluent neighborhoods of Winnetka,
Illinois, a northern suburb of Chicago.28 By this point, Rumsfeld’s
distaste for market intervention by the state was already apparent.
As a young adult, he attended the elite Ivy League Princeton
University, where he earned a degree in politics in 1954.29
Rumsfeld’s thesis argued in support of the recent Supreme Court
decision that ruled against the Truman administration’s (1945–
1953) attempted seizure of the steel industry in 1952 during the
Korean War (1950–1953).30 He later commented that he wished he
studied history instead of politics, citing his distaste for his leftwing professors who “littered the political science department.”
Rumsfeld noted, “I was struck by the way one professor in
particular seemed to disdain the private sector as rife with
corruption and unethical behavior. The business world was an
abstraction to him.”31 For Rumsfeld, this “business world” was
tangible and influential. As a politician, Rumsfeld personified the
corruption and unethical behavior of the private sector and the
27

Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 46.
“The Life & Times of Donald Rumsfeld,” PBS, October 26, 2004,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/etc/cronfeld.html.
29
PBS, “The Life & Times of Donald Rumsfeld.”
30
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 50-51.
31
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 50.
28

276

History in the Making

business world rebuked by Rumsfeld’s professor and converged
this corruption with the public sphere (government).
Start of Public Service
Shortly after his graduation, Rumsfeld enlisted in the United States
Navy and served as a pilot and flight instructor from 1954 to
1957.32 Rumsfeld entered American politics as an assistant to the
administrative staff of then-newly elected Congressman David S.
Dennison Jr. (1918–2001) (R-OH), followed by a similar role with
then-Congressman Robert P. Griffin (1923–2015) (R-MI) during
the years of 1957 to 1960.33 After a brief two-year stint at the
investment firm A.G. Becker, Rumsfeld decided to pursue his own
role in Congress and launched a campaign for a seat in the House
of Representatives in 1962 to represent his hometown region of the
northern suburbs of Chicago, Illinois. In his first attempt in an
electoral contest, Rumsfeld claimed victory. By age thirty,
Rumsfeld began his rapid ascension in the American political
system by first obtaining a seat in one of its most powerful
institutions: the House of Representatives.
Given Rumsfeld’s upper-middle-class status and his
institutional cultivation at an elite university, the United States
military, and then the United States Congress, it is perhaps no
surprise that he identified with the conservative Republican Party.
Rumsfeld’s early Congressional voting record showed that
although he did lean conservative regarding fiscal and economic
policies, he also supported socially progressive issues such as
enhanced civil and voting rights for African-Americans.34 Support
32

Vivienne Heines, “Rumsfeld Revealed: Secretary’s Navy career spanned 35
years,” Air Force Times, March 3, 2003,
https://archive.ph/20120722191209/http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0
-AIRPAPER-1610997.php.
33
“Rumsfeld, Donald Henry,” Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress,
accessed April 9, 2022, https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/R000508.
34
James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New
York: Penguin Group, 2004), 7.
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for the latter was a position not commonly held by the established,
rank-and-file Republican Party.
Rumsfeld’s relations with Republican Congressman and
then-Presidential nominee Barry Goldwater (1909–1998)
exemplified this political ambiguity or, more appropriately, his
opportunism. While Rumsfeld claimed that Goldwater’s staunch
opposition to the 1964 civil rights legislation made him feel
“uncomfortable… [he] generally agreed with him, however, on
economic issues and on national security.”35 As Goldwater’s 1964
presidential run ran into the ground, Rumsfeld began to actively
distance himself from Goldwater by attempting to avoid public
appearances with him. Despite this, Rumsfeld notes, “though I
didn’t see eye to eye with him on civil rights, I certainly intended
to vote for him.”36 Whether Rumsfeld’s politics were motivated by
an emerging political ideology or solely by political opportunism
and self-interest, is difficult to tell. Rumsfeld himself
acknowledged this seeming political ambiguity in his memoir
when recounting the major influences on his political upbringing.
Specifically, Rumsfeld recalls a speech given by the Democrat
Adlai Stevenson (1900–1965): “It might seem strange considering
my later career that the one who so strongly sparked the idea of
public service for me was a liberal Democrat.”37
While in Congress from 1963 to 1968, Rumsfeld formed
two friendships of great significance: Gerald Ford (1913–2006)
and the aforementioned Milton Friedman. Examining these two
relationships affords further insight into both Rumsfeld’s role in
Republican Party politics and his emerging political ideology.
Rumsfeld’s relationship with Ford began during their time in
Congress when they both played roles in reshaping the Republican
Party’s leadership in the House. The Republicans had recently lost
the 1964 elections, including then-presidential nominee Goldwater
and a majority of their Congressional candidates. Consequently, an
intra-party power struggle developed over who should lead the
35

Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 88.
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 89.
37
Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 51
36
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party in Congress going forward. Rumsfeld and his allies
challenged the established leadership and rallied behind a new
leader, Representative Gerald Ford of Michigan.38 Rumsfeld and
this faction eventually won out and established Ford as the new
Republican Party leader in the House between 1965 and 1973,
which paved the way for Ford’s later ascent as then-President
Nixon’s Vice-President from 1973 to 1974 and then ultimately his
role as President of the United States from 1974 to 1977. Rumsfeld
actively participated in this transition and was described as “one of
Ford’s closest advisors” during and after this episode.39 Given
Ford’s prominence in the then-near future, this was the formation
of a critical relationship and political alliance that greatly rewarded
Rumsfeld in his climb through the executive branch. Perhaps
equally influential not just on Rumsfeld, but the future of the entire
economic world order, was Milton Friedman.
Milton Friedman, Donald Rumsfeld, and the Neoliberal Terror
State
I spent thirty-three years and four months in active military
service and during that period I spent most of my time as a
high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street,
and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for
capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico
safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti
and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to
collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen
Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I
helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking
House of Brown Brothers in 1902–1912. I brought light to
the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in
1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit

38
39

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 8.
Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 8.
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companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that
Standard Oil went on its way unmolested.
-

Smedley Butler (1881–940) demonstrating how
American militarism works to secure blood money
for financial interests.40

Throughout Rumsfeld’s time as a Congressperson, he attended
seminars and lectures at the prestigious University of Chicago led
by the prominent economist Milton Friedman.41 Friedman
advocated for a new school of economic theories that came to be
known as neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is, according to leading
neoliberal critic and scholar David Harvey (b. 1935), “a theory of
political and economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and
free trade.”42 Neoliberalism posits that the role of the state is to
“create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such
practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and
integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense,
police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private
property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper
functioning of markets.”43 While neoliberalism calls for the
creation of markets where markets do not exist, “state intervention
in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum”44 In
other words, neoliberalism’s primary goal was the creation of the
40

Smedley Butler, War is a Racket: The Anti-War Classic by America’s Most
Decorated Soldier (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013), 16.
41
“Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld speaking at Tribute to Milton
Friedman (transcript),” United States Department of Defense, May 9, 2002,
https://web.archive.org/web/20060824220033/http://www.defenselink.mil/speec
hes/speech.aspx?speechid=216.
42
David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005) 2.
43
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2.
44
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 2.
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“free market” in which individuals could freely participate. Along
with the “free market,” the classical liberal ideals of individual
rights, freedom, and democracy were promised as a natural
consequence. The pursuit of this ‘free market” required the
reduction of state interference in the market, which included a
reversal of the Keynesian economic principles that emerged from
the Great Depression and World War II that advocated for
increased public spending on social safety nets and welfare
programs, along with national jobs programs, this reversal
consisted primarily of deregulation, privatization, and cutbacks in
public spending.45
Before the 1960s, the Keynesian economic principles of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) (1882–1945) successfully tamed part
of the post-war business cycle that had previously been so
explosive before imploding into the Great Depression Rumsfeld
was born into.46 However, the established economic order was
faltering by the end of the 1960s.47 Neoliberalism gained
popularity during this time; while Rumsfeld attended Friedman’s
lectures, the breakdown of Keynesian economics polarized many
into either the socialist/social democratic leaning state-control
camp or the neoliberal deregulation camp.48 Rumsfeld’s adoption
of neoliberalism, and later emphatic praise of Friedman,
demonstrates that Rumsfeld played a pivotal role in shaping the
modern world that neoliberal policy now dominates. Rumsfeld
summarized this in his eulogy for Friedman on May 9, 2002.
Rumsfeld stated, “What a difference forty years makes. Today,
many of those ideas that seemed outrageous and so unorthodox to
some in the 1960s are now the law of the land.”49 Rumsfeld,
45

Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New
York: Picador, 2007), 69.
46
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 10, 11.
47
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 10, 11.
48
Those in the state control camp argued against deregulation and in favor of
market intervention on varying levels on behalf of the state. Harvey, A Brief
History of Neoliberalism, 13.
49
“Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld speaking at Tribute to Milton
Friedman.”
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saddened and somewhat afraid by FDR’s death, remarked in his
memoir, “In my young mind, FDR was tied to my father, his ship,
our country, and the war. Now that monumental figure was gone. I
cried.”50 Nonetheless, it did not take long for Rumsfeld to break
with the political and economic conventions set by FDR; as noted,
he already sided against state intervention in the market in his
graduate thesis in 1954, approximately six years before the notable
downfall of Keynesian economics.
It is worth noting here that in Rumsfeld’s 2011 memoir,
Known and Unknown, Rumsfeld does not mention that he attended
Friedman’s lectures at The University of Chicago as he did while
speaking at a tribute to Friedman after his death in 2002. The first
mention of Friedman in his memoir appears on page 101. In this
account, Rumsfeld met Friedman when they served as advocates
for an all-volunteer military system on a debate panel hosted by
The University of Chicago. Rumsfeld admits he turned to
Friedman,
…many times over the years for advice and
guidance. Friedman’s belief in the power of
freedom was inspiring, and he felt the same way
about giving people the choice to serve in the
United States military as he did about giving them a
choice about their education.51
The page ends, and the topic changes many times before Friedman
is mentioned again, this time on page 125. Here, Friedman is not
referred to as an economist but again as an advocate for education.
It is strange that Rumsfeld either lied at his supposed friend’s
tribute to ingratiate himself or, did not find the room in his 800plus page memoir to mention these lectures, seemingly attempting
to obfuscate Friedman’s role as an economist.
This inconsistency is worth extra scrutiny when further
50
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examining other famous attendees of Friedman’s lectures at The
University of Chicago. Throughout the 1950s to 1970s, the Chilean
“Chicago Boys” were acolytes of Friedman’s, their attendance
arranged by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and paid for
with United States taxpayer dollars.52 Participants of this program
returned to Chile (and other home countries) afterward to serve as
ideological warriors against the growing tide of Third World
developmentalism, nationalization of foreign industry, and import
substitution (essentially, various levels of state intervention to
subsidize or nationalize products or industries on varying scales).53
The democratically elected Chilean government, under Marxist
Salvador Allende (1909–1973), served as the vanguard in this
growing wave of Latin American economic nationalism. After a
CIA-backed coup toppled Allende in favor of a military
dictatorship by Augusto Pinochet (1915–2006) on “the little
September the 11” of 1973, the “Chicago Boys” assumed positions
of power and quickly eliminated Allende’s popular programs in
favor of neoliberal deregulation and cuts to social spending.54
Opposition figures and protestors or political activists were
arrested, tortured, killed, or disappeared en masse by Pinochet’s
goons. Over 3,200 disappeared or were executed and at least
80,000 were arrested.55 Allende is without mention entirely in
Rumsfeld’s 2011 book, Pinochet is only mentioned once in the
footnotes of page 596 (in a strangely positive light), and Chile is
regarded as a democracy. These omissions and discrepancies leave
Rumsfeld an unreliable narrator at best and seem to indicate that he
attempted to obfuscate Friedman’s role in sponsoring state terror
and torture, just as Rumsfeld would later obfuscate his role
overseeing torture programs during the United States-led War on
Terror.
Friedman’s economic policies, first put into practice by
Pinochet’s Chilean police state, required the violent use of force
52
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which was antithetical to the supposed freedoms and individual
rights that neoliberal reforms promised to bring. Here, another
definition, or set of definitions, for neoliberalism set out by Harvey
is demonstrated. Neoliberalism is either a utopian project to realize
a theoretical design for international capitalism (the neoliberal pipe
dream that “free markets” automatically bring a freer society) or a
political project to restore the class power of the economic elite.56
The rhetoric surrounding the theoretical utopian project (i.e. human
or individual rights and freedom) is used as a system of
justification and legitimation for achieving the restoration of class
power. When the two come into conflict, the utopian ideals are
quickly discarded to further the consolidation of the select
economic elite.57
The United States-backed Chilean government’s
abandonment of these “utopian ideals” to further unfettered capital
was expressed in the state repression in Chile. However, this was
by no means an isolated incident. A handful of Latin American
countries participated in the wider effort to eliminate Third World
developmentalism for neoliberalism. Operation Condor (1968–
1989), for example, was a coordinated effort by police states to
turn South America into a “game reserve for hunting down anyone
these regimes thought objectionable.”58 Operation Condor included
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, amongst others, who
received massive amounts of United States taxpayer dollars.
Money was shoveled through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) programs and into police
departments who, along with the military received, United States
training in the use of explosives and torture.59
Given Rumsfeld’s later ascent and stature in the United
States government, it is of immense importance to acknowledge
56

Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 19.
Klein, The Shock Doctrine, 19.
58
Jeffery Ryan, “Turning on Their Masters: State Terrorism and Unlearning
Democracy in Uruguay,” in When States Kill, ed. Cecilia Menjivar & Nestor
Rodriguez ( University of Texas Press, 2005,) 298.
59
Ryan, “Turning on Their Masters,” 282, 298
57

284

History in the Making

and evaluate the influence of Friedman’s economic and political
theories in Rumsfeld’s decision-making and policies throughout
his career. In her 2008 book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of
Disaster Capitalism, author Naomi Klein (b. 1970) detailed the
relationship between these two figures: “[Rumsfeld] had developed
a particularly close connection with Milton Friedman…helping
[Rumsfeld] develop a bold free-market policy platform and
tutoring him in economic theory.”60 Reflecting on his relationship
with Friedman, Rumsfeld commented, “There is something about
Milton that when I am around him, and talking to him, I feel
smarter.”61 Regardless of the potential discrepancy surrounding
Rumsfeld’s attendance of Friedman’s lectures at The University of
Chicago, which is suspicious in itself, the fact that a tome as
lengthy as his 2011 memoir (again, 800-plus pages) devotes so
little space to establishing background information to his
supposedly “particularly close connection with Milton Friedman”
is also suspicious. The fact that Friedman, who reportedly helped
Rumsfeld develop his economic policies, is sparingly mentioned in
Rumsfeld’s memoir is suspicious. The fact that when he is
mentioned, his role as an economist is initially obfuscated adds
credence to the idea that Rumsfeld attempted to distance Friedman
and himself from the consequences of neoliberal policies abroad.
When Allende is not mentioned at all, while Pinochet is mentioned
once, in a slightly positive manner in a footnote, it becomes clear
that Rumsfeld purposefully obfuscated Friedman’s complicity with
state terror. Rumsfeld admired the deregulatory practices that
functioned as a thin veil of corporate greed preached by Friedman.
Once Rumsfeld left the lower echelons of representative politics
for a series of on-again-off-again positions in the White House, he
would ultimately find himself at a pinnacle of power capable of
influencing drastic reform.
Rumsfeld Enters the White House
60
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“The Eastern world, it is exploding.
Violent flares and bullets loading
You’re old enough to kill, but not for voting
You don't believe in war, but what’s that gun you’re toting?
And even the Jordan river has bodies floating,
and you tell me
Over and over and over again my friend
How you don’t believe we’re on the eve of destruction.”
-

Johnny Thunders, “Eve of Destruction.”62

“Don’t you understand what I’m trying to say
Can’t you feel the fears I’m feeling today
If the button is pushed there's no running away
There’ll be no one to save with the world in a grave.”
-

Barry McGuire, “Eve of Destruction.”63

The Nixon Years (1969–1974)
By 1968, Rumsfeld served multiple terms in Congress and aspired
to climb further up the political hierarchy. Throughout the year, he
became involved with Richard Nixon’s presidential campaign
(1969–1974). The Nixon campaign tasked Rumsfeld with
gathering political intelligence (“dirt”) on Nixon’s rivals.64 This
role culminated with Rumsfeld’s attendance at the Democratic
National Convention (DNC) of 1968, where he later relayed all the
information and insight he gathered to the Nixon campaign. These
activities ultimately pleased the Nixon team and, after Nixon’s
subsequent election that year, Rumsfeld looked to exchange his
62
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newly attained and valuable political capital for a role in the
incoming administration. After just six years in Congress, Donald
Rumsfeld had already set his sights on the next move: the White
House.
The position Nixon initially offered Rumsfeld, Director of
the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), was not accepted with
great enthusiasm. Rumsfeld turned down the position twice, citing
his voting record against anti-poverty programs and even the
legislation that initially established the OEO in 1964, as reasons he
did not want the position.65 Then-President John F. Kennedy
(1917–1953) created the nucleus of the OEO but Lyndon B.
Johnson’s administration (1963–1969) overhauled the OEO to
manage various programs for Johnson’s Great Society & War on
Poverty which increased government spending on social safety
nets and welfare programs.66 The incoming Nixon administration
not only had little interest in these offices and programs but
actively opposed them and hoped Rumsfeld’s fiscally conservative
neoliberal politics would sabotage the office’s capabilities.67
According to Rumsfeld, it was a call from Nixon—and a nudge
from his wife—that set up a face-to-face meeting between the two
where Nixon ultimately convinced him to take the position.68
These negotiations over a position in the administration marked the
beginning of a complicated personal relationship between Nixon
and Rumsfeld that facilitated Rumsfeld’s rise through the
executive branch. After the two agreed that Rumsfeld would
ultimately accept the OEO position, Rumsfeld gave Nixon
unsolicited foreign policy advice. Rumsfeld warned against the
continued secret bombing of Laos and Cambodia because of the
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potential media fallout if the information went public.69 This
interaction demonstrates Rumsfeld’s personal interests in foreign
policy and his preoccupation with the media as a political tool.
Rumsfeld’s interjections of his opinion became commonplace as
Rumsfeld was grafted closer to the Nixon inner circle, even though
he opposed heavyweights in the field like Henry Kissinger (b.
1923).70
The Nixon administration supposedly brought Rumsfeld
into the inner circle due to a potential legal hang-up and conflict of
interest that kept him from taking the position at the OEO in a
standard capacity.71 The legislation stipulated that any
Congressperson could not collect the salary of an appointed
position if that position’s salary increased during the
Congressperson’s tenure. However, Rumsfeld could be employed
as an aid to the President and filled the role at the OEO in that
capacity. Initially, Rumsfeld followed the Nixon administration’s
fiscally conservative script and moved to cut back on the OEO’s
fiscally liberal programs. Yet, in an unforeseen development,
Rumsfeld reversed course and became an advocate of the office
and worked to see the programs thrive.72
This turn by Rumsfeld was part of a political ploy to garner
support for himself and the office amongst a traditionally hostile
Republican Party.73 Rumsfeld hoped that the image of a
69
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Republican in control of the initially liberal OEO who managed to
turn it around into a successful office would be a powerful political
statement that united Americans behind the Nixon
administration.74 Rumsfeld’s management proved to be
particularly frustrating and disappointing to the Nixon
administration and media outlets reported that Rumsfeld “was
viewed with open hostility.”75 For Friedman, Rumsfeld’s actions at
the OEO were not only disappointing but, as Klein describes, an
act of “betrayal.”76 As one of Friedman’s acolytes, Rumsfeld was
perfectly positioned to implement the economic policies Friedman
preached (i.e., make steep cuts in government spending on social
welfare programs), however, he instead did the exact opposite.
This action was unacceptable for Friedman who “[a]t one
point…called Rumsfeld at the White House and berated his former
‘young pup.’ According to Rumsfeld, Friedman instructed him,
‘You have got to stop doing what you are doing.’”77 Nevertheless,
this episode of blatant disregard for the burgeoning neoliberal
teachings of Friedman proved to be an anomaly in Rumsfeld’s long
and destructive political career.
However, this episode demonstrated that Rumsfeld was less
of a committed ideologue and more of a political opportunist at
this point in his career. It is also worth noting that neoliberalism
was not yet the all-dominant ideology of the period, nor was it as
politically popular as it became following the election of Margaret
Thatcher (1925–2013) as the United Kingdom’s prime minister in
1979 and Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) as the United States’
president in 1981. In the economic turmoil of the 1970s, Keynesian
economics had not yet been buried by market interests when
Reagan declared that government was the problem and retained a
base of support. In the early 1970s, Nixon even signed in a
substantial new set of regulatory reforms passed by a Democratic
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Congress, remarking, “We are all Keynesians now.”78 However,
through the 1970s multiple economic tribulations (such as the
OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and the ensuing global recession in the
1980s) forced many to rethink their economic approach as
Keynesian economics seemed to be failing across the globe.
After the implementation of neoliberalism in Chile and the
suppression of the Pinochet regime’s violence, neoliberalism had a
supposedly successful model that its advocates could point to by
the Thatcher and Reagan era in the 1980s.79 Despite this,
neoliberalism’s harshest edges and austerity measures still had to
be tempered. According to Thatcher,
The progression from Allende’s Socialism to the
free enterprise capitalist economy of the 1980s is a
striking example of economic reform from which
we can learn many lessons. However…in Britain
with our democratic institution and the need for a
high degree of consent, some of the measures
adopted in Chile are quite unacceptable.80
Rumsfeld’s political instinct likely informed his decision to
distance himself from his earlier fiscal conservatism while at the
helm of the OEO much as Thatcher had to temper her own
approach.
Although Rumsfeld rejected his marching orders at the
OEO, he still garnered support from some of the highest figures in
the Nixon administration which included not only senior staff but
also Nixon himself.81 Some of the staff, such as Charles Colson
(1931–2012) and John Mitchell (1913–1988), vouched for
Rumsfeld because they believed him to be a valuable political
operative that could ultimately help the public’s perception of the
78
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Nixon administration.82 For example, Rumsfeld held a connection
to the Gallup polling group, which Nixon thought of as helpful in
shaping and manipulating public opinion.83 Despite his frequent
troubles, Rumsfeld knew how to exploit his political savvy to
maintain his access to power, as he did when he first gained favor
with the Nixon campaign in 1968 when he gathered intelligence at
the DNC.
As previously mentioned, the relationship between
Rumsfeld and Nixon was complicated. Frequently frustrated by
Rumsfeld’s actions, Nixon made derogatory comments about him.
Comments such as, “He’s a ruthless little bastard. You can be sure
of that.”84 Yet, Nixon also had an appreciation for Rumsfeld, given
their shared background as elected officials and politicians.85
Rumsfeld saw Nixon as a political mentor and wanted to exploit
this connection to advance his career, and thus they held numerous
private conversations discussing Rumsfeld’s path forward and
future roles in the administration.86 When Nixon and his staff
determined that Rumsfeld was too much of a political liability at
the OEO, he was given the new title of Counselor to the President,
however, this position came with no tangible role and no office or
department to lead or manage.87
During this time, Rumsfeld continued to challenge other,
more critical, components of the Nixon agenda, specifically their
foreign policy in Vietnam, as he did in their first meeting regarding
the OEO. Specifically, Rumsfeld criticized the Nixon-Kissinger
strategy of escalation and privately advocated for the war’s end.88
When Rumsfeld first advised Nixon against the bombing of
Cambodia and Laos, his primary concern was still the United
82
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States’ image. Rumsfeld was not motivated to stop the bombing
campaigns because they quickly turned Laos and Cambodia into
two of the most bombed countries per capita and bomb tonnage in
the world. Rather, Rumsfeld likely wanted Nixon to end the
bombings for pragmatic reasons. As the 1960s progressed, the
Vietnam War became less and less popular in the eyes of the
American public. He called for an end to the bombings because it
might look bad if the then-secret bombing campaigns went
public.89
However, this challenge on Vietnam led to more animosity
towards Rumsfeld, especially from Secretary of State Kissinger
who argued for his firing.90 Nonetheless, Rumsfeld evaded his
ouster once again. This evasion was due in part to the internal
support mentioned above, and also because Nixon and his advisers
determined that Rumsfeld’s criticism of the war effort in a public
setting could prove more damaging should he be dismissed from
the relatively private confines of the White House.91 Kissinger’s
worried comments regarding Rumsfeld demonstrates concern that
Rumsfeld could potentially leak information. Kissinger stated,
“He’s just positioning himself to be close to the Washington Post
and the New York Times.”92 But were Rumsfeld’s initial warnings
to Nixon about the secret bombing campaigns going public
actually a threat to gain political leverage? Kissinger had reason to
worry as Rumsfeld, in private conversations with Nixon (unearthed
as part of the release of the Nixon tapes during the Watergate
scandal), had already issued a warning or veiled threat to Nixon
about the potential consequences of his lack of a defined role;
“There is a problem, potentially, with a guy floating around the
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White House.”93 The implication was that without any defined
purpose or role, Rumsfeld could find himself interacting with
others the Nixon White House would not necessarily appreciate,
i.e. the media.
Once again, Rumsfeld exploited his political savvy and
trickery as his criticism and veiled threats afforded him future
conversations with Nixon concerning United States foreign policy.
Rumsfeld leveraged his inexperience in this realm to argue for a
new position that would afford him more experience and
prestige.94 Although Nixon initially refused to offer Rumsfeld any
position, Rumsfeld remained persistent in his request just as he did
as a Congressman, angling to get a role in the White House.95
Nixon, Kissinger, and other senior staff ultimately agreed it was in
their best interest to give in to his demands and keep him away
from the White House. They assigned Rumsfeld to the position of
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Ambassador, a role
that still lacked much prestige but enticed him due to his foreign
policy experience. Furthermore, the role placed him in Europe and
out of Nixon and Kissinger’s way, a win-win for all parties
involved.96
The Ford Administration (1974–1977) and Secretary of Defense
The move to NATO proved to be enormously consequential for
Rumsfeld’s burgeoning career. First, the new position played a part
in his evolving stances on foreign policy. According to PBS, the
NATO role was,
An appointment that dramatically change[d] his
political philosophy and the course of his career in
politics. It [was] Rumsfeld’s first direct
involvement in military and foreign policy, and the
93
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formal and unproductive European style of
diplomacy aggravates Rumsfeld, pushing him
toward more hawkish, action-oriented methods.97
Additionally, the role placed Rumsfeld across the Atlantic far
removed from the explosive Watergate scandal that erupted shortly
after and sank the Nixon White House. In one of the more
infamous political scandals in American history, police
apprehended individuals linked to the 1972 Nixon re-election
campaign as they attempted to burglarize the DNC’s office at the
Watergate Hotel in Washington DC. This episode set off a chain
reaction and investigations revealed further unsavory details about
the Nixon administration, including their efforts to cover up
Nixon’s links to the attempted burglary.98 As a consequence of this
scandal, Nixon resigned in disgrace. Yet, in an ironic twist,
Rumsfeld’s career was about to take off. Rumsfeld evaded any
links to Watergate, and his old congressional ally and friend,
Gerald Ford, assumed the presidency.
Rumsfeld immediately took a leading role on the transition
team and, shortly thereafter, Ford named him Chief of Staff.99
Rumsfeld’s rapid ascent in the political hierarchy saw him climb
from a low-level Nixon administration official to one of the closest
people to the new president in roughly five years. Riding
Rumsfeld’s coattails was one of his closest advisors and friend:
Richard “Dick” Cheney (b. 1941). Cheney first met Rumsfeld as a
congressional intern when he impressed Rumsfeld enough to be
hired on as a staff member when Rumsfeld led the OEO.100 Cheney
eventually became Rumsfeld’s right-hand man and assumed the
position of Deputy Chief of Staff at the start of the Ford
administration. As fast as Rumsfeld rose through the ranks, he took
Cheney along at an even faster pace. The two continually reunited
97
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in differing positions of political power over the coming decades,
culminating in Cheney securing the position of Vice President and
Rumsfeld’s return to Secretary of Defense during the W. Bush
administration from 2001 to 2009.
Despite Rumsfeld’s meteoric rise, he remained unsatisfied
and aspired to obtain a more distinguished role and influence
inside the White House. Rumsfeld ultimately achieved this in the
aftermath of one of the most significant White House and Cabinet
shakeups. Deemed the 1975 Halloween Massacre, then-President
Ford fired defense secretary James Schlesinger (1929–2014) and
replaced him with Rumsfeld.101 Additionally, Kissinger lost his
title of national security advisor but retained his position as
Secretary of State.102 Other notable moves included replacing
William Colby (1920–1996) as Director of CIA with H.W. Bush
(b. 1924–2018) and replacing Rumsfeld as White House Chief of
Staff with his protege Cheney.103 In Rumsfeld’s confirmation
hearing for his new defense secretary title, he described the
contemporary global security setting stating,
The hearing was dominated by the urgent national
security issue of the day: the Cold War. Millions of
Americans have since come of age without knowing
the fear of a nuclear exchange between two
superpowers. But as I went through the
confirmation process, the Soviet Union posed what
was widely considered, as then-President Kennedy
had put it, a ‘clear and present danger.’104
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Despite these comments, during his tenure as Secretary of Defense,
Rumsfeld played a significant role in bringing the two superpowers
closer to a nuclear exchange. (as will be detailed shortly). It is
telling that Rumsfeld relied on words from the Democratic
Kennedy, dead for over a decade by the time of Rumsfeld’s
confirmation, to make his point about the danger posed by the
Soviet Union. Contemporaries at the CIA soon disagreed with
Rumsfeld’s diagnosis of the danger posed by the Soviet Union.
His promotion to Secretary of Defense also signaled a
victory in the power struggle Rumsfeld waged with Kissinger, a
Nixon administration holdover who lost one of his two Cabinet
titles (National Security Advisor) during the 1975 Halloween
Massacre, for influence over Ford’s foreign policy.105 Rumsfeld,
just as he did when he was in the Nixon administration, criticized
and challenged Kissinger’s policies. Rumsfeld—the flight
instructor, Congressmen, head of an economic office, and briefly
ambassador to NATO—had little foreign policy experience
compared to Kissinger. Kissinger was an expert in nuclear
geopolitics and served in World War II, while Rumsfeld’s thesis
was on domestic trade, and his stint in the Navy kept him in the
United States This lack of genuine foreign policy experience,
however, hardly kept Rumsfeld from asserting his opinion when he
disagreed, as he did over the secret bombing of Laos and
Cambodia. In that case, Rumsfeld appeared to be a ‘dove’
(someone who opposed military confrontation), if only to help the
United States save face publicly in Rumsfeld’s case. However, his
positions in the Ford administration painted the picture of a
‘hawk.’ He opposed Detente, the easing of Cold War tensions with
the Soviet Union via greater diplomatic coordination, and its
accompanying arms control treaties, many of which Kissinger
negotiated.106 Rumsfeld argued for an increased defense budget to
105

Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 62-67.
Elaine Sciolino and Eric Schmitt, “Defense Choice Made a Name As an
Infighter,” The New York Times, January 8, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/08/us/defense-choice-made-a-name-as-aninfighter.html

106

296

History in the Making

meet the perceived security threat that the Soviet Union
supposedly imposed on the United States.107 In 1976, Rumsfeld
made his case before the press stating,
The Soviet Union has been busy. They’ve been
busy in terms of their level of effort, they’ve been
busy in terms of the actual weapons that they’ve
been producing, they’ve been busy in terms of
expanding production rates, they’ve been busy in
terms of expanding their institutional capability to
produce additional weapons at additional rates.
They’ve been busy in terms of expanding their
capability to increasingly improve the sophistication
of those weapons. Year after year after year they’ve
been demonstrating that they have steadiness of
purpose, that they’re purposeful about what they’re
doing.108
According to Adam Curtis (b. 1955), an English documentary
filmmaker, the CIA (amongst other organizations who constantly
monitored the Soviet Union) considered this “complete fiction” as
“there was no truth to Rumsfeld’s allegations.”109
To counter the established intelligence community’s claims
and bolster his own, Rumsfeld urged then-President and friend
Ford to establish an independent commission to investigate Soviet
nuclear capabilities.110 This commission, called “Team B,”
consisted of non-intelligence agents. Nevertheless, they were given
access to all relevant information available to the CIA and
analogous groups. Amongst this group was Rumsfeld’s future
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second in command (and frequent collaborator) at the Pentagon
during the W. Bush administration, Paul Wolfowitz (b.1943).
According to Melvin Goodman, Head of Soviet Affairs in the CIA
from 1976 to 1987, before Team B, “Rumsfeld and others, people
such as Paul Wolfowitz, wanted to get into the CIA, and the
mission was to create a much more severe view of the Soviet
Union, Soviet intentions, Soviet views about fighting and winning
a nuclear war.”111
After failing to infiltrate the CIA (not for the last time),
Rumsfeld and his hawkish allies used the Team B commission to
cynically manipulate United States foreign policy (again, not for
the last time) to fall in line with Rumsfeld’s view of the Soviet
Union. The head of Team B, Richard Pipes (1923–2018), was not
an expert on nuclear weapons or technology but supposedly a
leading expert in Soviet wartime psychology. Pipes developed the
idea of the “Soviet Hidden Mindset,” which claimed that despite
any evidence or statements to the contrary, the Soviet Union was
nevertheless preparing to attack America.112 Given Rumsfeld’s
earlier statements (which countered the prevailing intelligence
available) and his and Wolfowitz’s failure to internally manipulate
these very intelligence agencies, Team B must be understood as an
attempt to purposefully manipulate intelligence in a way that
would benefit Rumsfeld and his allies’ political ends. Assigning
such a staunch anti-Soviet fearmongering alarmist as Pipes to head
the team almost certainly ensured their findings would align with
Rumsfeld’s bellicose claims.
With access to all of the evidence and information available
to the CIA, Team B could not come up with any evidence of the
weapons they claimed the Soviet Union produced. Instead of
accepting that the weapons systems did not exist, they assumed
that the systems were actually so sophisticated that they just could
not be detected.113 Dr. Anne Cahn, who worked for the Arms
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Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1980, described
the situation as follows:
They couldn’t say that the Soviets had acoustic
means of picking up American submarines because
they couldn’t find them, so they said maybe they
have non-acoustic means of making our submarine
fleet vulnerable. But there was no evidence that
they had a non-acoustic system.114
She continued stating, “I would say that all of it was fantasy… if
you go through most of Team B’s specific allegations about
weapons systems, and you just examine them one by one, they
were all wrong. All of them.”115 The only evidence Team B
produced to back their claims that a highly sophisticated Soviet
missile system existed, which conflicted with the CIA’s
assessment of Soviet air defenses as dilapidated, was an official
Soviet training manual that claimed their Soviet air defense
systems functioned flawlessly.116
Despite the lack of evidence, the neoconservatives that
Rumsfeld now allied with established a lobbying group, called The
Committee on the Present Danger, to spread their findings; Ronald
Reagan was among the number of influential politicians to join.117
Rumsfeld’s alignment with this group of neoconservatives signaled
a break in United States foreign policy that ultimately led the
United States into what Curtis terms a “fantasyland of imagined [or
greatly exaggerated] enemies.”118 At this point, the
neoconservatives were attempting to assert that the Soviet Union
constituted a threat that most other analysts did not agree existed.
Soon the Soviet Union would no longer exist, and Rumsfeld and
company would be forced to find a new enemy to fearmonger
114
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against.
The Rise and Origins of the Neoconservatives
“For us, there are two kinds of people in the world. There
are those who are Christians and support free enterprise,
and there are the others.”
-

John Foster Dulles, The New York Times.119

“We’re closer to being revolutionaries than conservatives
in the sense that we want to change some deeply
entrenched notions about the proper role of American
power in the world.”
-

Richard Perle, “Power of Nightmares Part 2.”120

As with some of the other political positions Rumsfeld took in his
early days, it is difficult to separate actual ideology from political
opportunism. Kissinger and his allies adopted the more cynical
interpretation and determined Rumsfeld’s hawkish positioning as
an act of political opportunism on Rumsfeld’s part to endear
himself with the burgeoning neoconservative wing of the
Republican Party, and therefore advance his political ambitions.121
Kissinger cared little for ideology, religion, or the lives or rights of
people in the Third World and dealt in modern realpolitik. He
considered the world a complicated, interconnected, and intricate
balance of power, and only considered what must be done to
119
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preserve that balance of power.122 In Kissinger’s calculations, the
intricate global balance of power was never far from being thrown
into chaos, a preconception that lent itself to a consideration of
global contexts. For example, Nixon’s famous handshake with
Mao Zedong in 1972 was only possible with such consideration,
for the United States and a communist power to make amends
during the Cold War required a pragmatic and non-moralistic
approach.
Neoconservatives, on the other hand, saw the world in a
simple dichotomy of good versus evil, with the United States as the
premier force for good in the world destined to battle evil. The
neoconservative movement always had at least one foot firmly
planted in conservative Christian moralistic panic. The intellectual
and political fathers of the neoconservative movement, Leo Strauss
(1899–1973) and Irving Kristol (1920–2009), both emphasized the
lack of moral clarity in modern liberal society as degenerative.123
Kristol claimed in an interview that “the notion that a purely
secular society can cope with all of the terrible pathologies that
now affect our society, I think, has turned out to be false… I mean
I really think religion has a role now to play in redeeming the
country.”124 This pandering to the Christian right-wing ultimately
served the neoconservatives well, as it motivated masses of
Evangelical Americans, however, it also complicated Rumsfeld’s
relationship with the movement.125
Rumsfeld was a Presbyterian Christian, but was described
as “normally tight-lipped around religion” and personally claimed
to have “never been one to wear my faith on my sleeve.”126 It is
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somewhat strange then that Rumsfeld came to be so closely
associated with the neoconservative movement. But Rumsfeld’s
associations with the neoconservatives proved unshakable
throughout the decades. In 2004, in a BBC docuseries, “The Power
of Nightmares,” a smug Rumsfeld is on display when the narrator
first introduces American neoconservatives. The series recounts
the political ascension of neoconservatives, like Rumsfeld.
According to the director Adam Curtis,
At the heart of this story are two groups, the
American neoconservatives [here Rumsfeld is
presented on screen as the embodiment of the
movement] and the radical Islamists. Both were
idealists who were born out of the failure of the
liberal dream to build a better world. And both had
a very similar explanation for what caused that
failure… together they created today’s nightmare
vision.127
The explanation given by neoconservatives for the failure to build
a better world was the aforementioned lack of moral clarity
emphasized by Strauss and Kristol. Neoconservatives restored
moral clarity by trashing political complexity; the reconstruction of
the world in a template of black and white, good versus evil,
combined with righteous glory to form a delusional mix.
Rumsfeld’s public persona and media appearances over the coming
decades characterized the self-assured and self-righteous smugness
embodied by this worldview.
In foreign policy, this simplistic worldview expressed itself
in the neoconservative trend toward greater and increasingly
aggressive United States interventionism abroad. The
neoconservatives, the same politicians that positioned themselves
as the cleansing force of good in the world, did not consider
regional political context in their grand calculations to do away
127
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with evil. These efforts to purify the world included the use of the
military, not just to destroy “evil empires” like the Soviet Union or
dethrone dictators like Saddam, but to pursue American interests,
i.e., overthrow adversary governments and establish free-market
capitalism to benefit American companies. Thus, these efforts also
served as the militarist wing of neoliberalism, not only establishing
“free market” neoliberal capitalism through overt and covert aims
regardless of the consent of the governed, but Rumsfeld ultimately
turned the neoconservative’s wartime destruction, wrought to
establish a “free market,” into a closed feedback loop of neoliberal
profiteering during the W. Bush administration.128 Ultimately,
neoliberalism and neoconservatism served as two sides of the same
coin, guided by American exceptionalism and the pursuit of
American dominance of the world.
Proto-neoconservatives: The Dulles Brothers
Considering the neoconservative’s simplistic worldview and their
willingness to use military force to expand the reaches of
capitalism around the turn of the 1970s, they most resembled the
earlier Cold War mentality enshrined by McCarthy-ist
fearmongering and the power of the Dulles brothers during the
Eisenhower-era (1953–1961). This period of the late 1940s
through the late 1950s and into the early 1960s carried with a deep
anxiety and fear of an ever-looming communist threat.129 The fear
of Communism was used to justify the continued United States’
military presence across the globe in the post-war world. The
neoconservatives latched on to this same narrative and later used
the threat of Islamic terrorism after 9/11 to justify their military
adventurism. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s (1890–1969) election in
1953 ushered in Allen Dulles as the new head of the CIA and his
brother John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State.130 Allen’s
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previous underhand dealings with the SS in Operation Sunrise as
an OSS agent placed him as a “leading expert” in covert
operations.
If Rumsfeld can be placed in the political lineage of any
American political leader, it is with these two. The Dulles brothers
held intimate connections with the upper class of the United States’
business elite, as the two previously worked as lawyers for the
corporate firm Sullivan & Cromwell (amongst other similar
institutions).131 Before their tenure in the Eisenhower
administration, the Dulles’ (on their corporate client’s behalf)
presented their case to powerful government officials. Once inside
the government, appointed as two of the premier forces in the
formulation and execution of United States foreign policy, they
served as agents of their corporate friend’s interests.132 Like the
later neoconservatives, the Dulles brothers, also inspired by their
religious roots, saw the world in a simplistic good versus evil
dichotomy. John once summarized his worldview: “For us, there
are two kinds of people in the world. There are those who are
Christians and support free enterprise, and there are the others.”133
This quote aptly describes the neoconservatives’ view decades
later. Once in office, the two brothers quickly went to work to
further “free enterprise” against the “others” (those who opposed
such free enterprise).
In under two years, Allen and John organized and executed
successful regime change efforts in Iran and Guatemala on behalf
of corporate interests which served as a direct historical precedent
for the later neoconservatives and neoliberals.134 In Iran, the CIA
and MI6, The Secret Intelligence Service, fomented unrest against
the democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh (1882–1967)
by sending money and operatives to foster his opposition in 1953
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as a part of Operation Ajax.135 The Dulles’ also purposefully
mischaracterized Mossadegh as a communist to incite fear and
justify his removal.136 However, Mossadegh was no communist.
Rather, he acted as the leading figure in the efforts to nationalize
the British-dominated Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and
redirect Iranian oil profits into the development of their own
country.137 The British insisted that they must have their oil back
and aided in the propaganda campaign to convince the Americans
that Mossadegh was a threatening Soviet pawn.138 The Dulles’
used their powerful connections with the American business elite
to keep the New York Times from publishing contradictory
statements or evidence of the United States’ involvement in the
coup provided by one of their correspondents on the ground in
Iran, Kennet Love (1924–2014).139 Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
(1919–1980) was restored to power as an autocratic dictator that
marginalized Iran’s infantile democratic systems and set up a
repressive regime with its own secretive and inhumane torture
program, the SAVAK.140
In Guatemala, nationalist Jacobo Árbenz (1913–1971)
threatened The United Fruit Company’s massive agricultural
holdings that they acquired through a series of corrupt deals with
dictators. In total, this amounted to over 550,000 acres making up
one-fifth of all arable land in the country, with nationalization.141
The state even offered to compensate the company for part of the
land. Árbenz supposed that the Guatemalan state paid the company
1.185 million dollars for 234,00 acres of the 295,000-acre
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Tiquisate plantation, one of United Fruits dominions.142 United
Fruit previously declared its holdings to be worth the offered 1.185
million dollars in legal documents, however, the company
undervalued the land as part of a tax-dodging scheme.143 This
proposal was unacceptable and United Fruit called on the power
that their association with Sullivan & Cromwell, and thus the
Dulles brothers, afforded them. Árbenz’s attempt to redirect
Guatemala’s resources to be used for and by Guatemalans, and
away from United States corporations, was seen as Stalin’s second
coming, at least that is the picture United Fruit’s public relations
propagandist, Edward Bernays (1891–1995) painted on United
Fruit’s behalf.144
Allen quickly joined in on the project to smear Árbenz as a
communist as he could not stand idly by while the company he
personally held a large stock in was threatened.145 Allen Dulles
once again applied pressure on the New York Times, which pulled
their journalist Sydney Gruson (1916–1998) out of Guatemala after
Gruson disputed United Fruit’s fictitious vision of Arbenz as a
Communist. Allen also orchestrated the creation of a propaganda
radio station, “Voice of Liberation,” that spread disinformation on
the ground in Guatemala.146 The CIA launched Operation
Success—modeled after Operation Ajax—on December 3, 1953,
to depose Árbenz.147 Allen personally advocated for a more violent
approach: to arm opposition groups, then bomb the country to sow
the seeds of chaos that justified an overt United States-sponsored
coup to “restore order” in the country.148 Árbenz knew the
Americans were coming for him like they did Mossadegh and
implored the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to open an
inquiry into the situation. The United States successfully shut
142
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down the request on June 25, 1954.149 Árbenz had previously
turned to the Soviets to purchase arms in May of that year (the
weapons were mostly unusable or inadequate and outdated, The
United States previously supplied Guatemala with most of its arms,
however when Guatemala turned to democracy the United States
ceased its support).150 This weapons deal ultimately triggered
Allen and Eisenhower to begin a bombing campaign over
Guatemala on June 18, 1954.151 A military junta coordinated by the
United States removed Árbenz from power on June 27, 1954, but
the United States did not like his replacement, Colonel Carlos Diaz
(1915–2014), and they continued bombing until allies of CIA asset
Carlos Castillo Armas (1914–1957) took control of the country
briefly until Armas assumed direct power on July 5, 1954.152
The Dulles brothers’ foreign policy formulation was an
early embodiment of neoliberal market practices, justified by a
dogmatic religious worldview that wealthy politicians employed to
garner support for United States intervention abroad. Their actions
functioned as a blueprint for neoconservatives like Rumsfeld;
Friedman certainly loved the blueprint’s employment in Chile. In
both Iran and Guatemala, the Dulles brothers manipulated
information to fearmonger an exaggerated threat to further an
aggressive foreign policy in service of Western business interests.
Both times, market intervention by a government triggered a covert
operation or the use of military force to protect the market’s
existence (profit) on behalf of the United States which is, as David
Harvey notes, one of the only justified forms of state intervention
in the market according to neoliberalism.153 The Dulles’ militarism
also backfired in ways the neoconservatives would later contend
with and then replicate throughout the Middle East in the form of
blowback. Blowback is a concept in the intelligence community
referencing unintended consequences from covert/secret operations
149
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that may initiate a chain reaction of consequences for which the
general public has no frame of reference to contextualize the
events. By destroying Iran’s democracy and propping up the
Shah’s police state to continue sapping Iran’s resources, the United
States started a chain reaction that led thousands of protestors to
shout “Death to America” in the streets of Tehran and topple their
CIA-backed dictator in 1979.154 Thus, the Islamic Republic of Iran
was born and one of the neoconservatives’ great boogeymen in the
coming years emerged.
The Private Sector, PNAC, and Saddam Hussein
“They bombed innocent people, trying to murder Saddam
When you gave him those chemical weapons to go to war
with Iran
And the world doesn’t believe that you’re fighting for
freedom
Cause you fucked the Middle East, and gave birth to a
demon.”
-

Immortal Technique “The 4th Branch.”155

Rumsfeld in the Private Sector
Rumsfeld’s tenure at the upper echelons of United States foreign
policy did not last long as Ford lost the election to Democrat
Jimmy Carter (b. 1924) in 1976 and a political transition in the
White House forced Rumsfeld to the sidelines. From the time he
left Congress for the Nixon administration in early 1969, Rumsfeld
rose from the head of a marginalized domestic policy office to the
distinguished office of Secretary of Defense. Despite his consistent
challenges to the policies of Nixon and Kissinger, Rumsfeld
exploited his political savvy to attain more prestigious titles and
154

LeBor, “Overt and Covert.”
Immortal Technique, “The 4th Branch,” track 10 on Revolutionary Vol. 2,
Viper Records, 2003, CD.

155

308

History in the Making

greater political influence. Furthermore, Rumsfeld’s hawkish
foreign policy during the late Ford years from 1974 to 1977 served
as a symbol or signal of the impending rise of the neoconservative
movement. Rumsfeld and his new neoconservative political allies
shepherded the next iteration of an aggressive, American
exceptionalist foreign policy, a reincarnation of the Dulles
brothers’ policies at the start of the demonstrated by the examples
of Iran and Guatemala). At this time, the burgeoning
neoconservative movement had to compete for influence in the
arenas of domestic American politics and United States foreign
policy. Over the next several decades, however, Rumsfeld and the
neoconservatives would wield vast power and influence that would
afford them dominance in these areas and ultimately surpass the
destruction of their forerunners, the Dulles brothers.
With his party out of the White House following Carter’s
election in 1976, Rumsfeld was not out of work for long as he
decided to assume a role in the private sector. Despite having no
experience leading a company, Rumsfeld became President &
CEO of G.D. Searle & Co. between 1977 and 1985. Rumsfeld held
prior connections with the firm given its Chicago-based location
and its financial support for his Congressional campaigns.156 G.D.
Searle & Co. was a large corporation in the pharmaceutical
industry that is arguably most famous for developing artificial
sweetener aspartame. Rumsfeld’s tenure as CEO proved to be quite
a lucrative venture for him and the corporation.157 In particular, the
aforementioned aspartame was afforded FDA approval under
Rumsfeld’s guidance and he also facilitated a deal that ultimately
sold Searle to the agrochemical giant Monsanto, a deal that earned
him twelve million dollars.158 The approval of aspartame proved to
be a controversial decision as allegations of the artificial
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sweetener’s potential toxicity continually arose (and continue to
arise to this day).159
Rumsfeld’s self-enrichment through the private sector,
specifically the pharmaceutical industry, became a noticeable
pattern from this point on culminating in his position as Secretary
of Defense during the W. Bush administration. Rumsfeld’s tenure
as CEO was indicative of the wider neoliberal trend toward blatant
corruption CEO wealth skyrocketed compared to the median
worker’s compensation. In 1970, a CEO averaged a salary of thirty
times the median worker, and by 2000, the CEO’s figure was
nearly five hundred times that of the worker’s salary.160
After Rumsfeld left his Special Envoy role in the Reagan
administration which he occupied from 1983 to 1984 (covered in
detail shortly), he continued to oscillate between interests in the
private and public sector for the rest of this decade throughout the
1990s. After leaving Searle in 1985, Rumsfeld began preparing for
candidacy in the 1988 presidential election. To many, this was an
expected pursuit given Rumsfeld’s rapid ascension within the
political and governing hierarchies and his relentless efforts to
attain more considerable experience and prestigious titles during
his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Yet, his
presidential aspirations came to a crashing halt in 1987, before the
first primaries and caucuses were even held, due to a lack of
funding or popular support.161 From 1990 to 1993, he returned to
the helm of a large corporation as the CEO of General Instrument
Corp. where he found similar financial success by facilitating its
move to a publicly held company—again ballooning his personal
wealth.162
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Rumsfeld then returned to the pharmaceutical industry,
when he served as Chairman of the Board for Gilead Sciences
between 1997 and 2000.163 Both of these companies, General
Instruments and Gilead, had business dealings with the Department
of Defense, an explicit sign of the “revolving door” that is a feature
in American politics and economics. As Klein notes,
“[Rumsfeld’s] status as a former defense secretary, meanwhile,
made him a score for any company that was part of…the ‘militaryindustrial complex.’”164 His role at Gilead is noteworthy not only
because of his business activities during those years but more so
because of how these business links served to influence
Rumsfeld’s blatant corruption in his return to government during
the W. Bush administration (these decisions will be addressed in
greater detail in the next section).165
Rumsfeld and the Continuity of Government Exercises
Despite his financial success in private industry, Rumsfeld still
held deep political aspirations and remained connected with his
political networks. In the 1980 presidential election, Rumsfeld
believed that he was a solid candidate to be Ronald Reagan’s vice
president, given that his personal connections and friends were
advising the Reagan campaign.166 Although that decision did not
go his way, he remained involved in the federal government’s
executive branch throughout the Reagan years in a couple of
diverse ways. First, Rumsfeld participated in the Continuity of
Government exercises in the 1980s.167 Continuity of Government
(COG) was a Cold War-era classified program that strategized
federal government contingency plans during a potential crisis or
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emergency. 168 COG was designed to prevent a complete severance
of the governmental hierarchy, especially when tensions and the
threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union intensified (which
Rumsfeld’s earlier brinkmanship certainly did not help).169 During
the Reagan years, these exercises were held several times a year
and involved various current and former political and government
officials, including both Rumsfeld and Cheney who acted as “team
leaders” to establish parallel government leadership hierarchies to
avoid political decapitation from a nuclear strike.170
Although the Reagan administration inherited pre-existing
COG strategies and programs, the administration utilized executive
orders (such as EO 12656) that marginalized the Congress’s role in
establishing presidential succession hierarchies and drastically
revamped COG’s functionality. As a report published by the
Miami Herald described in 1987:
Reagan’s top advisers have operated a virtual
parallel government outside the traditional Cabinet
departments and agencies almost from the day
Reagan took office, congressional investigators and
administration officials have concluded. Secret
contacts throughout the government act on the
advisers’ behalf, but do not officially report to them.
The group is reportedly involved in arming the
Nicaraguan rebels, the leaking of information to
news agencies for propaganda purposes, the
drafting of martial law plans for national
emergencies, and the monitoring of United States
citizens considered potential security risks. 171
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The report concluded that “the secret parallel government” was
“tied to the highly classified Continuity of Government (COG)
program, originally designed to keep the government functioning
in times of disaster.”172
Critically, the Reagan administration’s version of COG
went beyond merely rehearsals or exercises for government
contingency and instead operated as a shadow government that
facilitated some of the administration’s most infamous (and illegal)
activities such as the Iran-Contra Affair (1981–1986). Iran-Contra,
orchestrated and facilitated by figures in Reagan’s National
Security Council and intelligence agencies, involved the covert
sale of various weapons to Iranian entities.173 The profits from the
sales were used to covertly fund the Contras, an extremely violent
“rebel” organization propped up by the Reagan administration in
an attempt to overthrow the Socialist Sandinista government
(1979–1990) in Nicaragua.174 Reagan’s COG delivered an inherent
challenge, by the Executive branch, to the established law and the
Constitution regarding the process of presidential succession by
sidestepping Congress entirely while also exploiting COG as a
front in the Iran-Contra operation that actively broke the law—as
Congress had already made the funding of the Contras by United
States intelligence agencies illegal.175 It is unclear to what extent
Rumsfeld participated in these darker functions of the Reagan-era
COG programs but it is noteworthy to mention his role here for a
few reasons. The first reason is that Rumsfeld’s COG participation,
as well as Iran-Contra, occur simultaneously with Rumsfeld’s brief
role as Special Envoy to the Middle East (discussed in the next
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section) which also happens to involve United States’ covert
foreign policy in Iran, specifically in the war between Iraq and
Iran. Second, during the 9/11 attacks, COG went live with former
Reagan-era COG team leaders Rumsfeld and Cheney now
occupying prominent roles in the W. Bush administration as
Secretary of Defense and Vice-President, respectively.176
Rumsfeld as Special Envoy to the Middle East
Rumsfeld also held a brief yet significant role in the Reagan
administration as a Special Envoy to the Middle East in parts of
1983 and 1984. The Reagan administration established the position
immediately following the aftermath of the deadly 1983 attack on
United States Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, in an attempt to retain
American influence in the region. It was a product of a more
extensive United States foreign policy operation to curtail and
sabotage the rising influence and power of Iran—a burgeoning
adversary to the United States’ interests in the region.177 With his
new role, Rumsfeld returned to his roots of challenging the foreign
policy consensus just as he did with Kissinger during his days in
the Nixon and Ford administrations. This time, Rumsfeld’s
primary target was Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
(1917–2006), who Rumsfeld accused of not being tough enough
with Iran and not effectively challenging its influence in the
region, specifically in Lebanon.178 In addition to causing
immediate friction within the Reagan administration’s foreign
policy team, Rumsfeld was assigned a noteworthy task as Special
Envoy: to meet with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.179
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During the infamous meetings between Saddam and
Rumsfeld, the two supposedly met to reinvigorate the relations
between the United States and Iraq within the greater context of
checking Iran’s power and influence.180 Given that Iraq and Iran
had been engaged in war since 1980, Iraq was considered the most
formidable challenge or opponent to Iran in the region, and this, of
course, served the United States’ interests.181 According to the
foreign correspondent Robert Fisk (1946–2020), throughout the
conflict, the United States’ security and intelligence agencies,
along with Western European counterparts, actively supplied Iraq
with “battlefield intelligence so that [Iraq] could prepare
themselves for the mass Iranian attacks.”182 The American
government attempted to conceal this joint-military cooperation
with Iraq against Iran from the public. Despite their efforts, the
information became widely public following a joint Newsweek and
Nightline investigation that called the United States’ cooperation
with Iraq against Iran a “Secret War.”183 The full scope of the
United States’ cooperation with Saddam came to light following an
initial investigation into the downing of Iran Air 655 on July 3,
1988, which killed 290 civilians.184 The USS Vincennes, a missile
cruiser in service with the United States Navy, shot down this
Iranian civilian airliner while the United States cruiser illegally
occupied Iranian national waters as part of a broader scheme to
provide naval support to Saddam’s ground troops; this maneuver
was known as Operation Praying Mantis in 1988.185
It did not end there, though. Part of the “battlefield
intelligence” the United States provided to Iraq to help them
“prepare for the mass Iranian attacks” included target sites and
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logistics for strategic and offensive bombing against Iran. This
collusion (ironic due to future circumstances) was ultimately born
out of another irony. The United States and Iraqi cooperation
began after Iraq bombed the USS Stark on May 17, 1987.186 After
this attack, which killed thirty-seven American military men, the
United States came closer together with Iraq and began sharing
intelligence and coordinating their bombing targets. Speaking in
memorial of those killed in the attack, neoconservative ally and
then-President Reagan singled out not Iraq but Iran.187 In supposed
honor of the men who died, the president did not scorn the
attackers but used it as a ploy to further what Nightline/Newsweek
called the “Secret War” in cooperation with Iraq, all while
continuing to demonize the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the closure
of the televised segment Ted Koppel (b. 1940) supposed that the
highly publicized Iran-Contra scandal (running from 1985 to 1992)
was, in part, a diversion from this support of the Iraqi war effort
against Iran.188
The meetings between Rumsfeld and Saddam were
ostensibly held to establish a United States Embassy in Iraq. In late
1984, after Rumsfeld had already departed from his position as
Special Envoy, the Reagan administration announced that it had
“restored full diplomatic relations with Iraq” due in part to the
groundwork Rumsfeld laid in his 1983 meetings with Saddam.189
Yet, other reports on this position revealed a much darker
component of these meetings wherein Rumsfeld was sent to
personally reassure Saddam of the United States’ support, despite
the United States’ widely known indiscriminate use of chemical
weapons against Iran.190
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The depravity and sheer irony of this entire episode are
utterly astonishing. For all the concern that would be later
promulgated by people like Rumsfeld about Saddam’s alleged
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), there was
not a scintilla of concern for the confirmed use of chemical
weapons when it served the interests of the United States foreign
policy and its conductors like Rumsfeld. Furthermore, this support
for Iraq and its blatant war crimes and crimes against humanity
completely undermines the idea that United States foreign policy is
governed by the pursuit of strengthening human rights. It is this
mythology that drives neoliberalism and neoconservatism and
positions the United States as the premier force for good in the
world. The brief history of United States foreign policy over the
better part of the twentieth and twenty-first century, through the
analysis of Rumsfeld’s life, ideology, and role in the United States
government, demonstrates the fallacy of the myth of American
exceptionalism and humanitarianism. And to top this all off,
Rumsfeld, of all possible figures, acted in the role of lead
facilitator in strengthening relations with Iraq when, in short order,
he would be a lead saboteur in these same relations in the W. Bush
administration.
Thus, Rumsfeld’s role as a conductor of United States
foreign policy lays bare the inconvenient truths and contradictions
embedded in these policies. Overall, this episode between the
United States and Iraq, mediated by Rumsfeld, reveals the actual
intentions of the United States foreign policy elite: to pursue the
geopolitical interests of the United States and to sabotage, by
whatever means necessary, potential and actual rivals such as Iran
and, later, Iraq. This would come to be enshrined as a set of
principles called Dual Containment where the United States
wished to limit both Iraqi and Iranian influence and hoped to pit
them against each other by fueling the flames on both sides during
the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. It was also enshrined in
another set of principles in the early 1990s known as the
Wolfowitz Doctrine. Named after Rumsfeld’s close
neoconservative ally, Wolfowitz, the Wolfowitz Doctrine is the
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informal name given to the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, a
biannual evaluation of the United States foreign policy
formulation. This was the first biannual revaluation since the
collapse of the Soviet Union at the turn of the decade and now the
United States, directed by the neoconservatives, saw itself as the
sole superpower in the world with no potential military adversary
to counter their neoliberal and neocolonial designs backed up by
military might.191
PNAC and the 1990s
During the 1996 presidential election, Rumsfeld shifted his
attention back to partisan politics as a foreign policy advisor and
then National Campaign Chair for the Republican Party candidate
Bob Dole (1923–2021).192 Here, Rumsfeld’s actions as a foreign
policy advisor show, once again, his preoccupation with
geopolitics throughout the decades, even when he was technically
out of government. Rumsfeld increased his participation and
affiliation with the Republican Party and neoconservative political
circles after his work on the Dole campaign. For example, between
1998 and 2000, Rumsfeld became a prominent figure in a series of
meetings that included the most established leaders in the
Republican Party.193 These meetings intended to determine the
policy platform of the Republican party in preparation for the
presidential election in 2000.194 Rumsfeld collaborated with
leading figures in the neoconservative faction—such as Cheney,
Wolfowitz, and Condoleezza Rice (b. 1954) on the foreign policy
platform.195
Additionally, Rumsfeld affiliated with a new think tank
called Project for the New American Century (PNAC) which
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produced reports and analyses on United States foreign policy.196
PNAC was founded and coordinated by many leading
neoconservative figures and intellectuals such as Bill Kristol (b.
1952), son of neoconservatism founder Irving Kristol, and Robert
(b. 1958) and Donald Kagan (1932–2021). The project promoted a
worldview that portrayed a United States that embraced its role as
a global hegemon, as supposed by the Wolfowitz Doctrine.197
Moreover, many individuals who collaborated in PNAC went on to
serve in the W. Bush administration. These collaborators included
Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney as Vice President,
Wolfowitz as Deputy Defense Secretary, John R. Bolton (b. 1948)
as a State Department official, and the United States Ambassador
to the United Nations, Richard Armitage (b. 1945) as Deputy
Secretary of State, and Elliot Abrams (b. 1948) as Deputy National
Security Advisor), among others.198
PNAC strongly advocated for policies that increased
military and national security spending, pursued and protected
American interests around the globe, and used aggressive military
force against states that threatened these interests.199 Rumsfeld,
196

Project for the New American Century home webpage, Internet Archive
Wayback Machine, accessed April 8, 2022,
https://web.archive.org/web/20130615140450/http://newamericancentury.org/in
dex.html.
197
William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a NeoReaganite Foreign
Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 1996. For more information, see also: “About PNAC.”
Project for the New American Century. Accessed April 5, 2022.
https://web.archive.org/web/20130615131127/http://newamericancentury.org/ab
outpnac.htm; Gary G. Kohls, “A Think Tank Named PNAC (the Project for a
New American Century),” Free Press, September 11, 2019,
https://freepress.org/article/think-tank-named-pnac-project-new-americancentury.
198
George Packer, “PNAC and Iraq,” The New Yorker, March 29, 2009,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/george-packer/pnac-and-iraq.
199
Donald Abelson, “First Impressions, Second Thoughts: Reflections on the
Changing Role of Think Tanks in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Critical Issues of Our
Time Vol. 8, (2011): 1-24,
https://web.archive.org/web/20121130180152/http://cas.uwo.ca/_files/Critical%
20issuesvol81.pdf.

319

In Memoriam

along with many of those listed above, was a signatory to PNAC’s
original Statement of Principles and was also involved in a PNACled campaign that pushed for the removal of Hussein in Iraq in
1998.200 One of PNAC’s most significant reports, Rebuilding
America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New
Century, published in 2000, called for a “transformation” of the
United States military (which PNAC affiliate Rumsfeld would
implement as incoming Defense Secretary) and detailed and
analyzed numerous strategies and findings of reestablishing and
maintaining the United States’ military superiority to facilitate its
global dominance. The goal of the report read as follows: “This
report proceeds from the belief that America should seek to
preserve and extend its position of global leadership by
maintaining the preeminence of the United States’ military
forces.”201
Moreover, the report emphasized throughout that the
“preeminence” of the United States, along with its interests, was
threatened by adversary nations such as China, Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea. Iraq was mentioned twenty-five times in the
document, more frequently than any of the other countries listed
above.202 According to PNAC,
The United States has for decades sought to play a
more permanent role in Gulf regional security.
While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the
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immediate justification, the need for a substantial
American force presence in the Gulf transcends the
issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.203
For PNAC and its contributors, Iraq was to be targeted by a
revamped and aggressive United States foreign policy, expressed
through the military. Iraq served as the model for how the United
States should deal with adversaries that “threatened” United States
interests around the globe.
During the same time as the rise of PNAC in the late 1990s,
Rumsfeld also advocated for the installment of an increased
quantity and advanced quality of missile defense systems as a
policy to meet these supposed threats.204 In 1998, Rumsfeld led the
Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States.205 This congressional commission, informally called the
Rumsfeld Commission, was fueled by the Congressional
Republican leadership’s discontent with the intelligence
community’s assertions that the United States was relatively secure
from ballistic missile threats. Thus, an external evaluation was
ordered.
Rumsfeld modeled the commission after the Ford-era Team
B intelligence review, a review Rumsfeld knew well given his role
as Defense Secretary at the time and because he personally urged
Ford to establish it in the first place. Moreover, Wolfowitz, who
also participated in the Team B review, served as a
commissioner.206 Unsurprisingly, given the political figures
involved, the Rumsfeld Commission followed the Team B
precedent and also concluded that the United States was more
insecure than the intelligence community’s assertions.207 The
commission’s report specifically named Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea as the greatest threats to United States national security. As
203
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noted, PNAC came to the same conclusion in 2000, and eventual
President W. Bush also grouped these three supposed adversaries
again publicly in an upcoming, and rather infamous, “Axis of Evil”
State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002.208 Overall, the
commission’s findings were used by the Republicans in Congress
not only to undermine then-President Bill Clinton’s administration
(1993–2001) but to call for more spending on missile defense
systems causing a boon for defense and weapons contractors.209
Several of the figures involved (such as Cheney,
Wolfowitz, Rice, and Rumsfeld) went on to occupy the highest
positions in the administration. They emphasized the
neoconservative critique of then-President Clinton’s foreign policy
as what they perceived as being too accommodating to geopolitical
rivals and adversaries, such as China, Russia, Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea.210 The Democratic Clinton administration did not publicly
embrace the Wolfowitz Doctrine, yet it offered no alternative
points of view and, ultimately, the rhetoric and actions of the
Clinton administration hardly differed from the directives of the
Wolfowitz Doctrine formulated under the H.W. Bush
administration, despite Rumsfeld’s and his ally’s criticisms.211 The
Clinton administration used their own spin on “liberal
internationalism” which functions to justify military operations
such as the spread of democratic values, economic liberalization
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(neoliberalism), and humanitarian concerns.212 These actions by
Clinton thus proved to launder these neoconservative views and
shifted the Democratic foreign policy towards the neoconservative
bent.213 Overall, the meetings amongst neoconservative
policymakers and thinkers, contributions with PNAC, and
collaborative work in the Rumsfeld Commission in the late 1990s
ultimately served as a staging ground for the foreign policy agenda
of the future W. Bush administration.
Ultimately, the Democrats’ inability or unwillingness to
offer an alternative to the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance
brought the parties together in a bipartisan consensus on the grand
schemes of United States foreign policy, “the Republicans didn’t
oppose Clinton’s economic vision of globalization
[neoliberalization], and the Democrats did not challenge the
Republican military vision of America as the sole superpower.”214
In the case of Iraq, Rumsfeld and his neoconservative PNAC
colleagues already laid the intellectual groundwork for an
aggressive United States military intervention to remove Saddam
from power in Iraq and establish a United States presence in the
country and region. The coming W. Bush administration, made up
of these exact figures, ultimately continued to make aggressive and
violent regime changes in Iraq, demonstrating the salience and
influence of these neoconservative schemes.
For Rumsfeld, his leadership on the commission and his
presence in the Republican Party’s meetings and discussions on
their foreign policy platform assisted in re-establishing Rumsfeld
as a prominent leader in this arena, especially during W. Bush
presidential campaign. Once W. Bush was named the Presidentelect, Rumsfeld was considered a prime candidate for one of the
administration’s top foreign policy posts. Initially, Rumsfeld was
considered for Director of the CIA, but former CIA director and
President, H.W. Bush, quashed this plan and advocated for
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continuity in this position, as opposed to making it a purely
political role.215 In 2000, Rumsfeld continued to angle to get into
the CIA, just as he was immediately before the Team B
Commission. As Director of the CIA, Rumsfeld would have had
massive and non-transparent influence over United States foreign
policy and he would have been able to direct covert operations in
service of neoliberal and neoconservative aims much like Allen
Dulles was able to during his reign in the OSS and CIA.
After being rejected from the CIA for a second time, thenPresident-elect W. Bush and incoming Vice President Cheney
selected Rumsfeld as the Secretary of Defense nominee.216 Cheney
made a strategic decision as he sought “to limit the authority of
Colin Powell (1937–2021) [incoming Secretary of State and
former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] over the
administration’s foreign policy.”217 Before being appointed
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell served in active duty
in Vietnam and as a chief advisor to the prior Secretary of Defense,
Caspar Weinberger (1917–2006), who Rumsfeld criticized for
being too soft on geopolitical adversaries. Under Weinberger,
Powell began to develop a set of principles later known as the
Powell Doctrine which set out a series of requirements to be met to
guarantee a successful military operation and avoid another
quagmire like the Vietnam War. The doctrine required a clearly
identified threat to the United States’ national security, a
predetermined goal and exit strategy, an overwhelming
deployment of troops as an occupation force capable of quickly
quelling insurrection, and popular support from the United States’
public and international community. Following these guidelines (or
Powell’s leadership) would have likely prevented the launch of the
global War on Terror. Moving Powell to Secretary of State where
he was in charge of civilian affairs and moving Rumsfeld to the
Pentagon as Secretary of Defense was a similar maneuver to the
Halloween Massacre of 1975 where Rumsfeld was appointed to
215
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Secretary of Defense for the first time to “limit the authority” of
Kissinger. A quarter-century after Rumsfeld first served as
Secretary of Defense during the Ford administration, he was now
about to take over the same position in a move that would
consolidate neoconservative influence over United States’ foreign
policy for years to come.
The War on Terror
“We gotta work to make the facts fit the false charges
Pull the wool over the eyes of the filthy masses
Stab the people in the back for the corporate choice
Roll the propaganda out using The People’s Voice…
The press scribble scribble every half-truth spoke
Then shoot it round the country like an April Fool's joke
Hype the nation for a Desert Storm love affair
Wave the stars and stripes like you just don’t care…
And on the TV screen
Diversion and aversion is the flavor of the day
Was it WMD’s or democracy?”
- Anti-Flag “The Press Corpse.”218

“Embedded correspondents don’t tell the source of the
tension
And they refuse to even mention European intervention
Or the massacres in Jenin, the innocent screams
U.S. manufactured missiles, and M-16's
Weapon contracts and corrupted American dreams
Media censorship blocking out the video screens…
It’s like MK ULTRA controlling your brain
218
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Suggestive thinking causing your perspective to change.”
-

Immortal Technique, “The 4th Branch.”219

Rumsfeld’s Neoliberal Transformation of the Pentagon and PNAC
Upon Rumsfeld’s return to the helm of the Pentagon under W.
Bush, he prioritized the objective of transforming the military. The
use of the word “transforming” or “transformation” is instructive
as it is the same language used by PNAC (over one hundred times)
in their 2000 report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy,
Forces and Resources For a New Century.220 Moreover, the PNAC
report explicitly cited both the “Cheney Defense Department” and
the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance (i.e. Wolfowitz Doctrine) as its
influence on the transformation. The report stated,
In broad terms, we saw the project as building upon
the defense strategy outlined by the Cheney
Defense Department in the waning days of the [W.]
Bush Administration. The Defense Policy Guidance
(DPG) drafted in the early months of 1992 provided
a blueprint for maintaining United States
preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power
rival, and shaping the international security order in
line with American principles and interests.221
To reiterate, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Wolfowitz all participated and
collaborated with PNAC and now occupied the appropriate
positions of power in the W. Bush administration to implement the
exact policies they and their PNAC affiliates promoted.
In one sense, this transformation meant bringing the
institution up to a twenty-first-century standard concerning its
219
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weaponry, technology, and strategy to effectively meet the
supposed threats as PNAC routinely urged.222 However, according
to Klein, this transformation was as much about economics as it
was about military capabilities.223 Influenced by his decades of
experience running large corporations (G.D. Searle, General
Instruments, Gilead Sciences), Rumsfeld brought many of the
same tendencies to the Pentagon, some of which included:
outsourcing, increased reliance on private contractors, cost-cutting
on labor, and increased privatization of Department of Defense
services and functions.224 This project of neoliberalism, obfuscated
through the abstract language of a “transformation,” aimed to
further entrench the interests of capital and profiteering at the heart
of government and at the heart of waging war.
In a now widely forgotten speech delivered by Rumsfeld on
September 10, 2001, he made the goals of this impending
neoliberal transformation clear when he explicitly called for
greater privatization efforts at the Pentagon to replace the
“inefficient” services and functions of government. According to
Klein, Rumsfeld “had already directed his senior staff to ‘scour the
Department [of Defense] for functions that could be performed
better and more cheaply through commercial outsourcing.’”225
Moreover, in reference to the Pentagon’s health services, Rumsfeld
explained that “some of those needs, especially where they may
involve general practice or specialties…might be more efficiently
delivered by the private sector.”226 With this speech, Rumsfeld put
the Pentagon on notice. In short order, the Pentagon was to be
“transformed” into one giant public-private partnership wherein
increased functions and operations–previously done in-house–were
222
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now outsourced to a network of for-profit private contractors. In
1992, the Cheney Defense Department laid the groundwork for this
neoliberal-sided transformation when it contracted with Kellogg
Brown & Root (KB&R), a subsidiary of Halliburton (an American
multinational corporation responsible for most of the world’s
hydraulic fracturing operations), to produce a study on the efficacy
of neoliberal privatization.227 The study found, unsurprisingly, that
such privatization would be a win-win for the government and
private corporations that key government officials such as Cheney
and Rumsfeld held connections to and had financial interests in
(such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin for Rumsfeld personally).
The production of the B2 bomber is most emblematic of this
neoliberal transformation’s interconnected economic and political
goals. By 2005, at least one part of the bomber was produced in
each of the fifty states ensuring continued bipartisan support for
privatization for the MIC, which created jobs in every
jurisdiction.228
Rumsfeld functioned as a conductor of this neoliberal
transformation, masquerading as a government official to
supposedly “serve the public interest” while simultaneously
advancing the profiteering interests of capital, as well as his own.
Gone were the days of the Nixon administration when Rumsfeld
advocated for increased social program spending at the OEO and
showed disregard for the script of his mentor, Friedman. Now in
his late sixties, with neoliberalism generally adopted as a
globalized economic consensus since the Clinton administration,
he fully embraced the economic theories of Friedman.229 Thirty
years after his stint at the OEO, he came back around to actualizing
Friedman’s goals of marginalizing the role of government and
giving more power and control to private enterprise and capital on
a scale infinitely larger than his old department.
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Whether Rumsfeld truly subscribed to the neoliberal
ideology espoused by Friedman or if those economic theories were
solely a vehicle to achieve his self-interests, his actions under the
W. Bush administration skirted the lines of blatant corruption.
Throughout Rumsfeld’s time as Secretary of Defense, there were
numerous conflicts of interest and controversies related to the
private contractors that did business with the Pentagon. One of the
most noteworthy conflicts of interest related to Rumsfeld was the
case of Gilead Sciences where he served as Chair of the Board
from 1997 to 2000. As part of his compensation, he held a sizable
amount of stock in the company, “[y]et despite his glaring conflict
of interest, Rumsfeld failed to sell off his Gilead stocks for his
entire term in office, holding on to somewhere between $8 million
and $39 million worth of Gilead holdings.”230 This move paid off
mightily for Rumsfeld when, a few years later, an Avian Flu
outbreak led the Department of Defense to purchase $58 million
worth of Tamiflu, a Gilead Sciences product, and the Department
of Health and Human Services purchased nearly $1 billion
worth.231 Between 2001 and the time Rumsfeld left his post as
Secretary of Defense in 2006, the stock price for Gilead had
increased by over eight hundred percent.232 This Gilead Sciences
affair demonstrates what Rumsfeld’s position as an agent of
neoliberalism entailed: the complete infiltration of private capital
and enterprise into the public sector so that their interests merge
into one, with extreme profiteering and self-enrichment as a result.
Rumsfeld synthesized the power and authority of both government
and capital. These Gilead contracts were one of the most blatant
forms of corruption between Rumsfeld’s Pentagon and private
contractors, but it was by no means the only case.
In addition to the Gilead conflict of interest, Rumsfeld also
held stocks in numerous defense industry firms, including MIC
behemoths such as Lockheed Martin and Boeing, during the W.
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Bush administration.233 Although he would elect to sell off the
stocks he owned in those larger firms, for other contractors he put
his holdings in a blind trust or asked for extensions to organize
these assets.234 All of these various conflicts of interest with
defense contractors imposed a direct impact on his functions as
defense secretary, as he begrudgingly recused himself from
decisions that involved companies in which he had a financial
stake.235
By no means, however, were these episodes of corruption
and war profiteering unique or only limited to the actions of a
rogue Rumsfeld. At least seventy-one companies received
contracts in the impending invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. All
of the top ten corporate recipients of government funding had ties
to former United States officials who worked in the Pentagon or
other parts of government. The number one recipient was the
aforementioned Halliburton (connected KB&R) which employed
roughly sixty-five thousand people in various private roles
assisting the troops.236 In roughly five years, Cheney’s own wealth
shot up from roughly one million or less to sixty or seventy
million.237 On the topic of Halliburton’s seemingly corrupt
dealings, Republican Senator John McCain (1936–2018)
commented, “It looks bad and apparently more than once
[Halliburton] has overcharged the federal government. That’s
wrong. I would have a public investigation of what they’ve
done.”238 Although he was a critical facilitator, Rumsfeld served as
merely a single node in a vast network of appointed and elected
government officials, defense contractors, and others who would
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financially benefit from this neoliberal transformation towards a
MIC-dominated foreign policy.
Despite the priority that Rumsfeld and the W. Bush
administration placed on this neoliberal transformation, other
leaders in the Pentagon and the military pushed back.239 In fact, in
that same widely forgotten speech delivered by Rumsfeld on
September 10, 2001, he declared the bureaucracy of the Pentagon
to be an “adversary that poses a threat, a serious threat to the
security of the United States of America…today we declare war on
bureaucracy.”240 This provocative stance stemmed from
Rumsfeld’s discontent with what he determined as obstacles to the
neoliberal transformation. Rumsfeld, however, was not the first to
complain about the barriers the contemporary Pentagon posed to a
potential transformation. In September 2000 (a year before
Rumsfeld’s speech), PNAC made a similar complaint about their
own “transformation” in Rebuilding America’s Defenses.241 In a
section entitled, “Creating Tomorrow’s Dominant Force,” the
report’s authors lament over a Pentagon “constrained” in its ability
to carry out PNAC’s recommendations to improve the military’s
capabilities due to its limited budget and resources.242 The authors
of the report go on to make a highly noteworthy prediction as to
how their recommendations may be adopted and implemented in
the future stating, “the process of transformation, even if it brings
revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some
catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.”243 It
is worth noting again some of Rumsfeld’s earlier testimony
surrounding his first-hand memories of Pearl Harbor, where he
hardly understood its significance but still understood that the
country must now go to war from a cursory understanding of
media reports and the public hysteria. After a catastrophic and
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catalyzing event, Rumsfeld didn’t need to know the facts, the
information was not important; the fever of war was infectious.
Only one year after the publication of Rebuilding
America’s Defenses, and mere hours after Rumsfeld’s Pentagon
speech, the United States was dealt this new Pearl Harbor when it
experienced arguably the most catastrophic and catalyzing event in
its history on September 11, 2001. Now, Rumsfeld and his other
PNAC-affiliated colleagues in the W. Bush administration would
see all of these obstacles brushed aside given the unprecedented
national emergency ushered in by the 9/11 attacks. This unilateral
power would be a transformation that went beyond the neoliberal
scheme at the Pentagon and even United States foreign policy; it
would engulf the entire political order of the world.
Rumsfeld’s War: Afghanistan (2001–2021)
“And is it possible that what took place on September
11th…that maybe out of this tragedy comes opportunity.
Maybe, just maybe, the world will sufficiently register the
danger that exists on the globe and have this event cause
the kind of sense of urgency and offer the kind of
opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion much
of the world.”
-

Donald Rumsfeld in an interview with The New
York Times on October 12, 2001.244

The 9/11 attacks marked a turning point in United States foreign
policy which was now shaped in the image of the neoconservatives
in the Bush administration who embodied the ideas of the
Wolfowitz Doctrine and PNAC. Moreover, 9/11 allowed these
neoconservatives to fast-track their agenda in a heightened
environment of fear. Fear like the fear Rumsfeld drummed up
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under Team B, repeated in The Rumsfeld Commission, and used to
sell the American public on a war in Iraq after 9/11, or even the
fear he remembered from Pearl Harbor that justified the United
States’ entrance into a war that the United States government had
been slowly trying to convince the public of. In other words, the
neoconservatives knew how to take advantage of the crisis. They
packaged their foreign policy under a catch-all term that
exemplified this heightened environment of fear: the War on
Terror. Afghanistan was to be the opening salvo of their war, as
one commentator on CNN put it shortly after 9/11: “We’re gonna
attack somebody, we’re gonna bomb some place, there’s no
question about that. The question is where are we gonna do it and
why?”245
Afghanistan remained a focal point of the United States’
foreign policy since at least the Carter administration (1977–1981)
when National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928–2017)
“was the driving force behind the Carter administration’s strategy
in Afghanistan” in a covert scheme called Operation Cyclone.246
This operation, coordinated by the CIA and Saudi and Pakistani
intelligence agencies between 1979 and 1992, involved the
funding, arming, training, and facilitating of fundamentalist
Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and the surrounding region,
called the Mujahideen; this included native Afghans and foreigners
such as the Saudi-born Osama bin Laden (1957–2011).247 The first
purpose of this operation was to support an armed rebellion by the
Mujahideen against the communist Afghan government to draw a
Soviet military response in aid of the Soviet-allied Afghan
government. Next, the operation aimed to ultimately support and
arm the Mujahideen in a guerrilla war with the Soviet Union
itself.248
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In an interview given in 1998, Brzezinski, in no uncertain
terms, explained what the goal of this operation was: “That secret
operation [Operation Cyclone] was an excellent idea. It had the
effect of drawing the Russians into an Afghan trap…The day that
the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President
Carter, essentially: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the
Soviet Union its Vietnam War.’”249 This opportunity, seized by
Brzezinski and the Carter administration, carried over into the
incoming Reagan administration. The CIA-backed Mujahideen
ultimately outlasted the Soviet Union in 1989, in large part due to
the failing Soviet economy, which forced their withdrawal from
the prolonged conflict. Both the neoconservatives and the Islamists
falsely believed that their collaborative project in Afghanistan was
solely responsible for the Soviet Union’s impending dissolution.250
Rather than consider the internal political contexts of the Soviet
Union’s dissolution, both believed a simpler myth that their
militaristic adventurism was directly responsible for the Soviet’s
fall.
In the aftermath, the victorious and empowered Mujahideen
factionalized and began to turn their inherited weapons against
each other in the power vacuum that was Afghanistan which led to
further bloodshed in a years-long violent civil war.251 Of the
various groups that formed as direct descendants of the
Mujahideen, two deserve mention: the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
These groups maintained fundamentalist Islamic extremist
tendencies but had distinct political goals. The Taliban, composed
of primarily ethnic Pashtuns, attained power in Afghanistan in
1996 after they gained control of the capital, Kabul. According to
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Fisk, “The Taliban had finally vanquished twelve of the fifteen
venal Afghan mujahedin militias…and imposed their own stark
legitimacy on its people. It was a purist, Sunni Wahhabi faith
whose interpretation of sharia recalled the most draconian of early
Christian prelates.”252 The Taliban primarily concerned itself with
establishing order via strict Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan
exclusively. It is also worth noting that despite the bellicosity of the
W. Bush administration towards the Taliban after 9/11, United
States companies such as the Union Oil Company of California
(Unocal) negotiated with the new Taliban government to secure
pipeline rights in the country.253 Two of Unocal’s employees—
Zalmay Khalilzad (b. 1951), future United States Ambassador to
Afghanistan from 2004 to 2005, and Hamid Karzai (b. 1957),
future President of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014—would then be
put in power by the W. Bush administration to facilitate
Afghanistan’s new government after the United States invasion.254
The second faction of the Mujahideen, al-Qaeda, was
largely created and led by Osama bin Laden. The faction devoted
itself to expelling the presence of the United States military in the
entire Middle East region.255 Bin Laden specifically protested the
United States military presence in his birthplace of Saudi Arabia
following the war in Iraq in 1991. Fisk argues that the “big mistake
by the Saudi regime of inviting the American troops revealed [the
Saudi regime’s] deception. They were giving their support to
nations [the United States] which were fighting against
Muslims.”256 The United States government began to blame alQaeda for violent terror tactics against United States government
infrastructure in and outside the region in the years before 9/11,
such as the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the
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United States Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
and the USS Cole bombing in Yemen in 2000.257 Throughout the
mid to late 1990s, bin Laden lived in Afghanistan with the
permission of the Taliban.258 Nevertheless, the United States
government accused bin Laden of operating al-Qaeda while he
lived here. Critics of the United States’ narrative pointed out the
disconnection between the allegations and the reality. Fisk, who
personally interviewed bin Laden multiple times, questioned,
Was [Osama’s tent in the Afghan mountainsides]
really…the centre of ‘world terror’? Listening to the
spokesman at the United States State Department,
reading the editorials in The New York Times or The
Washington Post, I might have been forgiven for
believing that bin Laden ran his ‘terror network’
from a state-of-the-art bunker of computers and
digitalized battle plans, flicking a switch to instruct
his followers to assault another Western target. But
this man seemed divorced from the outside
world.259
Nevertheless, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, the W. Bush administration began to confidently assert
that al-Qaeda and bin Laden were primarily responsible, despite
the absence of a thoroughly comprehensive investigation.260 In an
interview in 2001, Condoleezza Rice—then-National Security
Advisor—stated that “everybody assumed that it was al-Qaeda
because the operation looked like al-Qaeda, quacked like al-Qaeda,
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seemed like al-Qaeda.”261 After the W. Bush administration
assigned blame for the attacks to al-Qaeda, they decided to launch
a war in Afghanistan to eliminate their presence and its Taliban
sponsors. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld assumed his turn to
manage United States foreign policy in Afghanistan, which
effectively involved the destruction of the descendants of the
Mujahideen. Yesterday’s holy warriors who had the unbridled
support of United States foreign policy elites in both the Carter and
Reagan administration (Rumsfeld included) were today’s
terrorists.262 Like the Soviets in 1979, the United States began a
nightmarish invasion of Afghanistan and, on October 7, 2001, just
twenty-six days after the 9/11 attacks, the United States launched
Operation Enduring Freedom with a United States-led invasion and
assault on Afghanistan.
By December of 2001, the war had begun to severely
cripple the Taliban, and United States media reported that the
Taliban leaders were offering terms of surrender to the United
States-backed Northern Alliance and its leader Hamid Karzai (b.
1957).263 Rumsfeld, however, showed no interest in negotiating a
surrender. According to New York Times writer, Brain Knowlton
(n.d.),
Mr. Rumsfeld raised questions…about the
agreement, saying that United States forces were
continuing their attacks unabated in eastern and
southern Afghanistan and saying that the war was
far from being over…‘I do not think there will be a
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negotiated end to the situation that’s unacceptable
to the United States.’264
Consequently, the war continued while the W. Bush administration
and Rumsfeld turned their attention away from Afghanistan and
focused on the next stage of the War on Terror. Rumsfeld and
other officials in the administration maintained their sights on
Saddam and Iraq.265 Meanwhile, Afghanistan and its people were
subject to a war that went on for almost twenty more years and
extended into three subsequent presidential administrations:
Obama (2009–2017), Trump (2017–2021), and Biden (2021–
Present). By the time of the final withdrawal in 2021, over 200,000
people were killed in this war with a conservative estimate of over
70,000 civilians.266
In a war euphemistically named Operation Enduring
Freedom (reportedly coined by Rumsfeld) after nearly twenty
years of bloodshed and the United States’ occupation, only
violence and death have appeared to endure while freedom has not
existed in any substantial form let alone endured.267 As former
NATO commander Wesley Clark (b. 1944) testified in an
interview with Democracy Now!, this invasion of Afghanistan
represented only the beginning of a larger plot:
About ten days after 9/11, I went through the
Pentagon and I saw Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz… and one of the generals
called me in, he said, “Sir, you gotta come in,
you’ve gotta come in and talk to me a second”…He
says “We’ve made the decision we’re going to war
264
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with Iraq”... I said “We’re going to war with Iraq?
Why?” He said, “I don’t know.” He said, “I guess
they don’t know what else to do.” So I said, “Well
did they find some information connecting Saddam
to al-Qaeda?” He said, “No, no… there’s nothing
new that way they just made the decision to go to
war with Iraq”... So I came back to see him a few
weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in
Afghanistan, I said, “Are we still going to war with
Iraq?” And he said, “Oh it’s worse than that.” He
reached over on his desk, he picked up a piece of
paper and he said, “I just got this down from
upstairs”—meaning the Secretary of Defense’s
[Rumsfeld’s] office—he said, “This is a memo that
describes how we’re going to take out seven
countries in five years starting with Iraq, and then
Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and
finishing off, Iran.”268
As of 2022, a bipartisan consensus effectively implemented this
neoconservative policy. All of these countries have been targeted
by the United States (such as Syria and Libya under Obama, or
Biden’s redeployment to Somalia declared on May 16, 2022) or
their allies (such as Israeli aggression against Lebanon) with direct
military action or constant saber-rattling and intermittent conflict
(such as then-President Trump’s assassination of Iranian General
Qassem Soleimani (1957–2020).269
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Rumsfeld’s War: Iraq (2003–2011)
Iraq was in the crosshairs of United States foreign policy for years
before the 2003 invasion. The United States had already launched
a devastating war in Iraq during the H.W. Bush administration
from 1990 to 1991 in reaction to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990. The United States-led coalition bombed large swaths of Iraqi
infrastructure, including civilian infrastructures such as electricity
grids and water treatment facilities.270 The bombing campaign was
backed up by years of sanctions placed on Iraq that crippled their
ability to rebuild the water treatment facilities which led to
contaminated water supplies spreading disease like wildfire. Along
with the initial bombings, these actions by the United States racked
up a massive body count, likely into the millions. Then-President
Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright (1937–2022),
infamously justified this body count of roughly “half a million
children… more than died in Hiroshima” as “worth it” in an
interview with 60 Minutes.271 This was not enough blood spilled
and the neoconservatives, particularly those affiliated with PNAC,
clamored for the United States to finish the job and remove
Saddam from power.272 With many of those same PNAC affiliates
and contributors now nestled in the W. Bush administration, it was
only a matter of time before they pulled the trigger and American
bombs flew over Iraq. Through these actions,
The United States deliberately targeted the civilian
infrastructure of Iraq to make the war aims more
easily attainable. But unlike in 1991, when it could
270
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afford to just wreck a whole country and walk away
from the mess, this time around it is committed to
fostering a whole new political order in Iraq.273
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Rumsfeld and the W.
Bush administration attempted to link Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda,
and the 9/11 attacks to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. A report from CBS
News recounting these efforts stated that Rumsfeld “was telling his
aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq—even though there
was no evidence linking Saddam Hussein to the attacks.”274
Another report from investigative journalist Bob Woodward (b.
1943) writes that in a meeting the night of 9/11, “Rumsfeld
actually puts Iraq on the table and says ‘part of our response maybe
should be attacking Iraq. It’s an opportunity.’”275 The W. Bush
administration’s conjecture about Saddam’s role in the attacks
quickly became public through the facilitation of the mass media.
In fact, polls from that time showed that sizable majorities of
respondents believed that Saddam was involved or responsible for
these attacks.276 Nevertheless, the administration ultimately
decided that more convincing intelligence and time were needed to
make a case for going to war with Iraq, and Afghanistan was the
first hit.
Rumsfeld led the effort in building the case for war with
Iraq. He aimed to convince the public through his frequently
televised press conferences held to boast of the now infamous
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claims that Iraq, and specifically Saddam, possessed an arsenal of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).277 In a press conference in
February 2002, a full year before the invasion, he stated that “there
are known knowns” regarding the existence of WMDs.278 This
claim implies that Saddam’s Iraq posed a national security threat to
the United States and could lead to another 9/11-like event if left
unchecked. This episode harkens back to the Team B findings
where a lack of evidence of Soviet weapons did not interfere with
the neoconservative’s supposedly “known known” of a nonexistent missile defense system. Rumsfeld’s efforts in this push for
war went beyond simply presenting the “intelligence” for the
public’s consumption; he also worked behind the scenes to
manufacture the faulty “intelligence.”
According to the journalist Seymour Hersh (b. 1937) who
reported on the W. Bush administration’s push for war with Iraq,
Rumsfeld and his deputy, Wolfowitz, organized what was deemed
a “cabal” of analysts in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans
(OSP) to “find evidence…that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al
Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical,
biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the
region and, potentially, the United States.”279 Furthermore, Hersh
also reported that this OSP cabal “rivaled both the CIA and the
Pentagon’s own Defense Intelligence Agency, (DIA), as thenPresident [W.] Bush’s main source of intelligence regarding Iraq’s
possible possession of weapons of mass destruction.”280
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Rumsfeld’s decades of experience manipulating intelligence and
public opinion proved helpful in constructing this case, now in
charge of a new Team B to sell a faulty war based on a greatly
exaggerated threat. On the global front of the war’s buildup,
Rumsfeld publicly chastised European allies, such as Germany,
France, and even the United Kingdom, if they showed even the
slightest hesitation to join the United States in the war.281 In nearly
every way the war effort could be advanced, Rumsfeld functioned
as the focal point and lead conductor. Under no circumstances was
Iraq to be spared.
When the war with Iraq finally commenced in March 2003,
Rumsfeld (in addition to still overseeing the war effort in
Afghanistan) now helped orchestrate the Shock & Awe campaign
the United States military unleashed on Iraq. Shock & Awe,
referred to formally as the Doctrine of Rapid Dominance by its
authors at the National Defense University, was an expression of
raw American military might characterized by the use of
“overwhelming force.” The authors, Harlan K. Ullman (b. 1941)
and James P. Wade (n.d.), spell this out explicitly:
Shutting [Iraq] down would entail both the physical
destruction of appropriate infrastructure and the shutdown
and control of the flow of all vital information and
associated commerce so rapidly as to achieve a level of
national shock akin to the effect that dropping nuclear
weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese.
Simultaneously, Iraq’s armed forces would be paralyzed
with the neutralization or destruction of its capabilities.
Deception, disinformation, and misinformation would be
applied massively.282
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Seemingly overnight, Shock & Awe had completely crippled and
destroyed not only Iraq’s military but Iraqi society itself—the
damage was especially severe in the capital Baghdad.283 According
to former New York Times war correspondent Chris Hedges (b.
1965), who covered the war and was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in
2002 for his coverage of terrorism at the New York Times, “Shock
and Awe saw the dropping of 3,000 bombs on civilian areas that
killed over seven thousand noncombatants in the first two months
of the war.”284 During the post-9/11 hysteria that Rumsfeld helped
stir up, dissenting opinions were sidelined, as was Hedges. Even
though Hedges spoke fluent Arabic and lived in Iraq and
throughout the Middle East during his time as a journalist, the New
York Times ultimately forced his resignation for his criticism of the
Shock & Awe campaign.285
Shock & Awe was not confined solely to the overwhelming
display of military might. Noting the inherent psychological aspect
of this warfare, Klein stated, “Rumsfeld’s war would use
everything short of a nuclear bomb to put on a show designed to
bombard the senses, pull and play on emotion, and convey lasting
messages.”286 Klein argues that this psychological aspect was a
critical component of Shock & Awe as it became the “blueprint”
for sending messages all around the world, especially to those who
dared to challenge the authority of the United States.287 Designed
to inflict mass fear and terror amongst the target population as well
as for the global audience, Shock & Awe became the ultimate
symbol of the transformation of the United States’ foreign policy; a
transformation angled towards explicit offensive wars to bring
perceived challengers and threats to the United States hegemony to
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heel. This was the full realization of the neoconservatives’ foreign
policy goals. It began in the days of the Ford administration when
a young Rumsfeld, acting as Secretary of Defense, challenged the
perceived complacency of the foreign policy elite towards the
Soviet Union. In a post-Soviet world with no equivalent challenger
to the United States’ hegemony, coupled with the
neoconservative’s dominance in the United States’ foreign policy,
the war of aggression against Iraq and Afghanistan were the first
disastrous strikes in the War on Terror that only continued to
expand in the region for decades.
The very nature of the Shock & Awe bombing campaigns
almost necessarily created the circumstances that ensured that the
War on Terror became an unending quagmire. Rumsfeld himself
once personally asked, “Are we creating more terrorists than we’re
killing?”288 Genocide studies scholar at Yale University, Ben
Kiernan, answers this question affirmatively. The mass killing of
civilians and extensive damage to civilian infrastructure quickly
turned public opinion against the United States in the populations
affected, making many who lost loved ones, their homes, and
livelihoods more receptive to extremist rhetoric. In 2012, former
director of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center, Robert Greiner
(n.d.), reflected on drone strikes in Yemen:
One wonders how many Yemenis may be moved in
the future to violent extremism in reaction to
carelessly targeted missile strikes.” That same
month, a Yemeni lawyer Ibrahim Monthana (n.d.)
wrote in an open letter to then-President Obama
“when a United States drone missile kills a child in
Yemen, the father will go to war with you,
guaranteed. Nothing to do with Al Qaeda.”289
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Despite a near-endless drip of media propaganda surrounding the
use of “smart bombs” or “precision-guided munitions” (PMGs),
the use of large explosives with high fragmentation and penetrating
power in densely inhabited urban spaces necessarily entailed
civilian casualties.290 Bruce Cronin (n.d.) at the Department of
Political Science at the City College of New York calls this the
“collateral damage exception to IHL [International Humanitarian
Law].” The IHL resulted in,
Legally sanctioned warfighting strategies that result
in significant numbers of civilian casualties. Such
an exception allows military organizations to follow
IHL while killing and injuring many civilians
during their operations…They do so by employing
overwhelming force under conditions that they
know are likely to fatally affect the civilian
population. Under these conditions, collateral
damage may be incidental but it is also usually
foreseeable and therefore preventable. Such
calculations push the boundaries of legal
behavior.291
On July 22, 2022, Rumsfeld claimed that “we can take some
comfort in the knowledge that this war has seen fewer tragic losses
of civilian life than perhaps any war in modern history. We can
also take pride in the fact that coalition forces have gone to
extraordinary lengths not only to avoid civilian deaths but to save
civilian lives.”292 The arguments provided by Cronin contradict
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Rumsfeld’s claims.
Neoliberal Torture Racket
There are a few aspects of the War on Terror that deserve deeper
scrutiny throughout Rumsfeld’s term as Secretary of Defense,
which lasted until the end of 2006: the “reconstruction” efforts and
the systemic corruption and abuse of prisoners of war (POWs).
Reconstruction, a principal component of the war in Iraq, included
extreme war-profiteering that remained at the heart of Rumsfeld’s
neoliberal transformation at the Pentagon. In this effort to rebuild a
destroyed Iraq, the United States government handed out a
seemingly limitless amount of money to private, for-profit
contractors to facilitate these projects.293 This was not only a boon
for the web of Department of Defense (DoD) contractors, but also
for government officials and politicians who had links to these
firms, for example, then-Vice President Cheney and his old firm
Halliburton.294 Yet despite the endless flow of money used to help
rebuild Iraq, the efforts mostly failed due to rampant corruption
and the persistent security threat in Iraq, which United States
policy exacerbated through aggressive bombing campaigns as
detailed above.295
Although this furthered the Iraqi toil, it made no difference
to the contractors who already had their cash in hand. To quote
293
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Klein, “This was the genius of Rumsfeld’s ‘transformation’ plan:
since every possible aspect of both destruction and reconstruction
has been outsourced and privatized, there’s an economic boom [for
both]...a closed profit-loop of destruction and reconstruction.”296
To reiterate, in a Pentagon fully dominated by the interests of
capital and led by corrupted agents of the MIC like Rumsfeld,
every decision was heavily influenced by return on investment or
profiteering. Whether it was the so-called reconstruction efforts or
the waging of war itself, the economic benefits would be realized
by this nexus of public-private actors, furthered by the W. Bush
appointed head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (responsible
for oversight of the reconstruction effort), Paul Bremer (b. 1941).
Bremer instituted “the full privatization of public enterprises, full
ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full
repatriation of foreign profits… the opening of Iraq’s banks to
foreign control… and the elimination of nearly all trade
barriers.”297 This pertained to every aspect of the economy,
including “public services, the media, manufacturing, services,
transportation, finance, and construction.”298 For Iraqis, their
interests were marginalized (if not entirely ignored) and brushed
aside. According to Harvey, “strikes were effectively forbidden in
key sectors and the right to unionize restricted. A highly regressive
‘flat tax’ (an ambitious tax-reform plan long advocated for
implementation by conservatives in the United States ) was also
imposed.”299 The supposed reconstruction became just another
layer in the deep injustice that had been levied upon Iraqis that
some critics argued violated the Geneva (1864–1949) and Hague
(1899 and 1907) Conventions, “since an occupying power is
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mandated to guard the assets of an occupied country and not sell
them off.”300
The systemic corruption and abuse of POWs is another
aspect of Rumsfeld’s War on Terror policies that deserves more
attention. Similar to the reconstruction efforts, the policies and
schemes implemented by Rumsfeld and the W. Bush
administration to purge both Afghanistan and Iraq of supposed
terrorists via mass imprisonment were poisoned by the corruption
and extreme profiteering of private interests. For example, in
Afghanistan,
Once the prisoners arrive at the destination, they
face interrogators, some of whom will not be
employed by the CIA or the military but by private
contractors. If these freelance interrogators are to
keep landing lucrative contracts, they must extract
from prisoners the kind of ‘actionable intelligence’
their employers in Washington are looking for. It’s
a dynamic ripe for abuse…contractors have a
powerful economic incentive to use whatever
techniques are necessary to produce the sought-after
information, regardless of its reliability.301
At this point it is quite apparent how the neoliberal transformation
Rumsfeld shepherded into the Pentagon, infused with outsourcing
to private contractors and profiteering, thoroughly and
systematically corrupted nearly every aspect of these wars. From
the launching of the wars themselves, the so-called reconstruction,
and even the detainment and mass imprisonment of enemy
combatants, all were guided by schemes designed to enrich the
contractors who performed the duties.
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This culture of corruption was so intoxicating that it also
ensnared the locals of these countries, especially in Afghanistan
where CIA and private contractors offered bounties to the locals to
provide intelligence or turn in suspected terrorists. These bounties
paid roughly three thousand to twenty-five thousand dollars for alQaeda or Taliban fighters, Klein noted that “soon enough, the cells
of Bagram and Guantanamo were overflowing with goatherds,
cabdrivers, cooks and shopkeepers—all lethally dangerous
according to the men who turned them over and collected the
rewards.”302 Consequently, the lure of the blood-soaked dollar not
only fueled the destruction and death of the wars but also the mass
imprisonment schemes of innocent locals, now labeled as
dangerous terrorists. Unsurprisingly, this malevolence was only
one feature of the systemic abuse of the prisoners. Inside the
prisons, a whole other system of absolute horror took place.
Rumsfeld, along with other W. Bush administration
officials, argued that the Geneva Conventions, the documents
establishing the international legal standards for humanitarian
treatment in war, did not protect POWs captured in Afghanistan
and Iraq due to their newly assigned label of “enemy
combatants.”303 Rumsfeld was a key player in this endeavor.
According to Michael Ratner, “On January 19, 2002, defendant
Rumsfeld [Ratner’s book, The Trial of Donald Rumsfeld, is
presented as a court case] informed the chief of the United States
military, Richard B. Myers [b. 1942], that those detained in the war
against Afghanistan would not be granted prisoner of war status as
would normally be required by the Geneva Conventions. They
would not even be given hearings to determine if they were
prisoners of war.”304 This ad hoc legal distinction served as the
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legal basis for both “administrative detention” (imprisonment
without trial) and “enhanced interrogation” (torture).
In Iraq, a policy of mass imprisonment of Iraqi troops who
surrendered or were captured led to systemic abuse by United
States troops, most emblematic in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal
which publicized widespread torture and the abuse of prisoners.305
Ratner explains that as part of the torture programs “human beings
were stripped, hung from ceilings, beaten, threatened and attacked
by dogs, sexually abused, subjected to hot and cold temperatures,
deprived of food and sleep, waterboarded, and held in isolation day
after day, month after month. More than occasionally, they died
from torture.”306
When the crimes against humanity at Abu Ghraib became
known, Rumsfeld appeared to shoulder the blame after being
subject to intense criticism and even offered his resignation.307
Then-President W. Bush, however, refused this offer and kept him
on board. To be clear, although Rumsfeld publicly shouldered this
blame, this should not be confused with him disapproving or being
unaware of these detestable acts. As a Frontline documentary
entitled “Rumsfeld’s War” explains, “Rumsfeld [had] already
promulgated some harsher interrogation techniques of his own,
including the use of dogs to intimidate, stripping, deprivation of
food in combination with stress positions for a given amount of
time.”308 Moreover, in a declassified memo dated December 2,
2002 (well before the publicization of the torture at Abu Ghraib)
Rumsfeld bemoaned of the apparent gentleness of these
“interrogation techniques” stating, “I stand for eight to ten hours a
305
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day. Why is standing limited to four hours?”309 In this same memo,
Rumsfeld personally signed off on the aforementioned use of
“hooding, stripping, dogs, and sleep deprivation” on detainees.310
Despite this, Rumsfeld later claimed in his memoir that,
None of the authorized interrogation methods—
either those approved in December 2002 and used
on one detainee until I rescinded them, or those that
I later approved in April 2003—involved physical
or mental pain. None were inhumane. None met any
reasonable person’s definition of torture.311
Rumsfeld then goes on to also deny that waterboarding never
occurred in Guantanamo Bay and defends torture as critical for
getting key information out of al-Qaeda operatives.312 This is
counter to what Ratner and The Center for Constitutional Rights
claim which was that “tortured people say whatever they can to
stop the torture, and often the information is false.”313
Rumsfeld’s denial then appraisal of torture is also
emblematic of the entire administration’s stance. Once again
deferring to Ratner and The Center for Constitutional Rights,
The [W.] Bush administration has argued from both
sides of its mouth in its efforts simultaneously to
deny that it has engaged in a torture program and to
justify the use of torture. On the one hand, it claims
it does not torture and treats prisoners humanely. As
you will see, it makes this claim because it has
redefined torture and inhumane treatment so that the
309
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coercive interrogations it employs do not come
within what courts, treaties, and lawyers always
found constituted torture. At the same time it denies
employing torture, the [W.] Bush administration
insists that it needs harsh interrogation tactics to get
information, and that the president, in the name of
national security and self-defense, may employ
torture. In fact, his lawyers argue that there are no
limits on the cruelties he can impose on others if he
thinks he needs to do so to make us safer.314
The Abu Ghraib scandal was not a phenomenon but merely one
node in a global infrastructure of systematic imprisonment and
torture—anchored by CIA black sites and the Guantanamo Bay
detention facilities—erected by the United States Military in the
War on Terror and under the watch of Rumsfeld, along with other
officials in the W. Bush administration.315 The global torture
infrastructure did not wither away after the ignominious exit of the
administration but instead remained very much intact and a feature
of the United States’ so-called “rules-based order,” an Orwellian
term used to obfuscate that the United States does not obey actual
international law. As Ratner notes,
Did Rumsfeld authorize conduct that constituted
war crimes? Absolutely…According to the report of
the government’s Schlesinger investigation, the
entire military chain of command was involved…
up to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld… None of the
defendants fulfilled their legally mandated roles to
prohibit torture; all were complicit in the
propagation of torture.316
Media and Information Manipulation
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Throughout the War on Terror, Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives
in the W. Bush administration directly and purposefully
manipulated information and evidence to the media and inside the
government. This manipulation aimed to both manufacture the
public’s consent for the wars and to obfuscate and obscure the
crimes (discussed above) associated with the wars. Information
manipulation as a means to promote aggressive policy represented
a continuation of Rumsfeld’s standard operating procedure a la the
Team B Commission. Furthermore, it was in line with the even
longer history of manipulation by the likes of the Dulles brothers.
According to Tom Rosenstiel (n.d.), former executive director of
the American Press Institute and founder and former director of the
Project for Excellence in Journalism,
We now know that you had people on the vice
president’s [Cheney] staff talking to Judy Miller
[New York Times reporter], who was one of the key
reporters doing these stories for the Times, leaking
that material to her or helping her with her stories.
Those stories would appear, and then they would
reference the very material that they’d given her and
say, ‘See, this is coming from The New York Times,
not just us,’ when, in fact, it was coming from the
administration.317
This trickery is emblematic of the advancements of the
political and economic elites’ ability to control information and
thus public opinion. The Dulles brothers used their connections to
pressure The New York Times to suppress information from their
reporters on the ground in Guatemala and Iran. While these simple
methods were still employed, as in the aforementioned Hedges
case of censorship (also at the hands of The New York Times), the
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infiltration of the media by the W. Bush administration was
comprehensive:
Officials offered various new pieces of prooccupation information to particular news outlets
who would subsequently relay these new ‘leads’ or
‘facts’ to the public. In later discussions, officials
would cite the press pieces as the source of their
information, although officials generated and
provided materials to the news outlets in the first
place.318
Rumsfeld himself played an active role in this
manipulation. The subterfuge included the manipulation of internal
government information through the Office of Special Plans (OSP)
that Rumsfeld created. The OSP concocted half-truths about Iraq to
create talking points that justified the war, such as Saddam’s
supposed WMD programs which Rumsfeld propagated with
outdated and out-of-context evidence from the 1980s.319 Moreover,
Rumsfeld’s OSP not only manufactured false information for the
wars but also filtered and distributed false information from the
web of private intelligence contractors who, as discussed above,
had an economic incentive to manipulate information to keep their
DoD contracts. According to Klein,
Part of the reason the W. Bush administration has
relied so heavily on private intelligence contractors
working in new structures like Rumsfeld’s secretive
[OSP] is that they have proven far more willing
than their counterparts in governments to massage
and manipulate information to meet its political
goals of the administration—after all, their next
contract depends on it.320
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Yet another example of how the corruptive force of profiteering
fueled seemingly every consequence of the wars.
Rumsfeld’s active manipulation did not begin and end with
the OSP, however. Wesley Clark’s testimony (presented above)
about a memo (originating from Rumsfeld’s office) planning to
take out seven countries in five years just days after 9/11 is also
indicative of this manipulation of information and policy from the
inside. Externally, Rumsfeld made many media appearances to tow
the official talking points, such as his December 2, 2001,
appearance on Meet the Press where he asserted, without providing
any substantive evidence, the existence of elaborate multi-story
underground bunkers used by bin Laden and al-Qaeda, complete
with electricity and ventilation.321
Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives had already decided on
going to war with Iraq before 9/11, however, they needed to garner
public support for the war. Throughout his tenure as Secretary of
Defense, Rumsfeld held frequent televised press briefings on the
wars which helped in the administration’s domination over the
supposedly “free” media.322 The perception of the media as
completely independent, when it was heavily manipulated, proved
instrumental in selling the war. As put by Charles Lewis (b. 1953)
at the Center for Public Integrity, “We have this idea that we have
lots of information available. There is so much that’s not available
and so much of the ‘truth’ is obscured by political actors who don’t
want the world to see what they’re doing.”323 Rumsfeld’s
dismissive comments during his televised press briefings
characterized the whole ordeal: “Needless to say that the President
is correct” and “I’m working my way to figure out how I’m not
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going to answer that.”324 Dan Rather (b. 1931) of CBS News
explained the situation expertly when he stated, “What’s going on,
I’m sorry to say, is a belief that the public doesn’t need to
know.”325 As a twenty-year war veteran who quit after seeing the
manipulation of intelligence in the OSP firsthand put it, “If you
join the military now, you are not defending the United States of
America. You are helping certain policy makers pursue an imperial
agenda.”326 To sell this imperial agenda, language and the media
were manipulated thoroughly.
The Orwellian language draped around aggressive military
operations (i.e. Operation Enduring Freedom), a feature of W.
Bush-era neoconservative propaganda, proved to be influential as
the Obama administration adopted this same technique. For
example, when the Obama administration went to war with Libya
in 2011, the NATO operation was christened “Operation Unified
Protector.” As will be shown in the closing segment, the operation
only further endangered the civilians it was ostensibly created to
protect. Other Orwellian constructions of language included the
obfuscation of statistics by labeling many killed as “military-aged
males” or “unlawful enemy combatants” or simply “abstract
collateral damage.”327 By using these labels, the
military/government could avoid including these deaths in the
civilian casualties and the media could glance over the pile of
Iraqi, Afghan, and other brown bodies to fixate on much smaller
losses incurred by the United States and its allies.328 Additionally,
the dozens of combat zones the War on Terror spread to are often
labeled “conflicts” or “engagements” or, in the case of Libya, a
“humanitarian mission,” and not “wars.” This manipulation of
language serves to avoid the hot topic of “war” by simply denying
it exists by omitting the word. It also gives the executive branch
more breathing room from Congressional oversight supposedly
324

Why We Fight, 1:11:31.
Why We Fight, 1:11:25.
326
Why We Fight, 1:16:35.
327
Herold, “Unworthy Afghan Bodies,” 304, 309.
328
Herold, “Unworthy Afghan Bodies,” 303, 304.
325

357

In Memoriam

required to conduct a “war.”
The obfuscation of individuals’ status as “unlawful enemy
combatants” complicates the process of totaling the number of
innocent lives taken by the War on Terror which varies widely
depending on the particular methodology. Some outlets claim the
War on Terror took hundreds of thousands of lives while others
claim it took millions.329 This issue is complicated further in the
case of Iraq when trying to estimate the total killed. Does it start in
2003 or the 1990 bombing and sanction campaigns? Are the deaths
resulting from sanction and disease to be counted in either case?
These discrepancies created plausible deniability for the United
States government to always assert the lowest estimates possible
for the damage they wrought, though Rumsfeld and the
neoconservatives did not invent this trickery. Calculating lives lost
in war has always been difficult for a multitude of reasons. From
the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the
firebombing that burnt down almost every other Japanese city
including Tokyo to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the margin of
error for deaths is massive and the exact figures are contentious.330
In Cambodia, for example, it is estimated that the bombing
campaigns during the Johnson and Nixon administrations (the
bombings that Rumsfeld “warned” Nixon against) killed between
50,000 to 150,000 innocent people in a country the United States
was not at war with.331 The estimated losses in Laos reach as high
as 750,000 civilians.332 During the Vietnam War, the United States
lost roughly 58,000 men. Even based on the conservative estimates
for just Cambodian deaths, it becomes apparent that the United
States killed more Cambodians than Americans died in Vietnam
between 1964 and 1973. Under Johnson, the Cambodian and
Laotian bombing campaigns were named Operation Menu; under
329
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Nixon (perhaps with Rumsfeld’s influence), the bombing
campaigns earned the euphemism Operation Freedom Deal, a
precursor to the misleading names of Operation Enduring Freedom
or Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The information about the Cambodian bombing campaigns
that the Clinton administration released to the public in 2000 shook
the established consensus on the estimated damage wrought by the
bombs dropped on Cambodia (and Laos). Before Clinton
declassified available data, the generally accepted bomb tonnage
dropped over Cambodia was only a quarter of what was actually
dropped which was around 2,756,941 tons, and that is only from
the incomplete Pentagon datasets that list over 10,000 instances of
indiscriminate bombing.333 It is likely that in the coming years, it
will also be easier to calculate the damage of Rumsfeld’s wars
through currently classified information. However, it is already a
documented fact that Rumsfeld and other officials blatantly lied
about many aspects of the war efforts and its consequences,
whether it was Saddam’s WMDs or their knowledge of torture
programs during the War on Terror. Furthermore, when they did
not lie outright about the legality of their designs, they used more
manipulative language to rhetorically dance around legal
loopholes, such as Rumsfeld’s reclassification of POWs to skirt the
Geneva conventions. All of the blatant lies and manipulation were
a constant in the W. Bush administration and eventually outlasted
Rumsfeld who, by late 2006, saw his time at the helm of the
Pentagon come to a premature end.
By the time of Rumsfeld’s departure in late 2006, the War
on Terror proved to be a full-fledged disaster. United States steel
and depleted uranium continued to rain over Afghanistan and Iraq
with no end in sight.334 The reconstruction and counterinsurgency
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efforts in both countries were failing.335 Fueled by the United
States’ occupation and sustained terror at the hand of the
occupying American force, the threat of violence by the region’s
inhabitants had only metastasized.336 By all accounts, the wars
were complete catastrophes and politically unpopular amongst the
vast majority of the American population.337 By the time W. Bush
left office, his approval rating was down to just twenty-four
percent.338 For Rumsfeld, his prospects did not look any better. He
faced widespread calls to resign, led by a group of retired generals
and admirals who had decided to speak out against his strategic
failures.339 General Hugh Shelton (b. 1942), chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff from 1997 to 2001, later claimed that “it was the
worst style of leadership [he] witnessed in 38 years of
service...based on deception, deceit, working political agendas, and
trying to get the Joint Chiefs to support an action that might not be
the right thing to do for the country but would work well for the
President from a political standpoint.”340
In November of 2006, Rumsfeld—despite then-President
W. Bush’s public support—formally resigned as Secretary of
Defense. This resignation marked the end of Rumsfeld’s time in
government and his position of power over United States foreign
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policy. Although he was forced to retire in shame, he would be
able to retire in the comfort of his home, a privilege that hundreds
of thousands of Iraqis, Afghans, and other victims in the War on
Terror, along with thousands of United States troops, did not
have.341 As of 2022, millions of people are forcibly displaced due
to the ever-growing maelstrom of violence unleashed by the
seemingly never-ending consequences spreading across the region
afflicted by the War on Terror that Rumsfeld spat upon the
world.342
Rumsfeld Out of Office and the War Continues
“The haze got me thinking why
We killed Osama and plenty of innocent people died
We should see the signs, but we still be blind
No disrespect to the man or the legend but
I’m sick and tired of asking my brethren if
It all ends in 2011
Would God come through or would he actually forget us?
Cause apocalypse is getting closer
But they’re more focused on our ‘lil youth sippin’ soda
Fuck the sugar act, ***** out pushing crack
And I lost my father figure because of that.”
-

Capital Steez, “Free the Robots.”343

“Rumsfeld was the worst secretary of defense in American
history. Being newly dead shouldn’t spare him this
distinction.”
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-

George Packer, The Atlantic.344

Despite Rumsfeld’s seemingly ignominious exit from the W. Bush
administration, he lived the last chapter of his life quite
comfortably. In fact, in the years immediately after his resignation
Rumsfeld still received honors and distinctions from ideologically
aligned institutions such as the Claremont Institute Statesmanship
Award in 2007, the Victory of Freedom Award from the Richard
Nixon Foundation in 2010, and the “Defender of the Constitution
Award” from the Conservative Political Action Conference in
2011.345 Of course, this is not necessarily an anomaly as some of
the most prestigious awards in the world, like the Nobel Peace
Prize, have been given to American “statesmen” such as Kissinger
and Obama, despite their explicitly contradictory records to what
the awards are supposed to represent; i.e. Kissinger’s support for
extreme bombing campaigns in South East Asia, and Obama’s
disastrous surge in Afghanistan and expansion of drone warfare
into several countries with a record so dismal one would guess it
was designed to hunt civilians.346 The point is that, as a member of
the American political elite, Rumsfeld was ultimately protected
from any real consequences for his decisions and policies
344
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regardless of how destructive they were for the people caught in
the maelstrom of violence. Rumsfeld garnered praise for his
actions not only through ideological political institutions but also
by gaining perverse accolades such as People magazine’s “sexiest
man alive” in 2002, “CNN called him a ‘virtual rock star,’ FOX
dubbed him a beltway ‘babe magnet,’ [a]nd The Wall Street
Journal hailed ‘the new hunk of home-front airtime.”347
Rumsfeld did not hold any government titles or lead any
corporations in his later years. However, that is not to say he was
rarely seen or heard from as he periodically gave interviews and
speeches. He was particularly active in the media circuit during
2011 to promote his new memoir entitled, Known and Unknown, a
play on one of his most notable quips during his routine press
conferences as the Secretary of Defense in the W. Bush
administration. In many of these interviews, Rumsfeld was asked
to reflect on his decisions and policies regarding the War on
Terror. He was even asked for his supposedly “expert” opinion on
current foreign policy issues. For example, in an ABC News
interview in 2011, he offered criticism of the Obama
administration’s handling of the Libya crisis and urged that the
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (1942–2011) must be removed
from power because it would negatively affect the “prestige” of the
United States if Gaddafi remained.348 Even in exile, Rumsfeld still
advocated for the United States’ military intervention in the
political affairs of nations in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Bipartisan Consensus
347
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The Obama administration’s stance on Libya ultimately fell in line
with Rumsfeld’s prescriptions, and Gaddafi was removed from
power and murdered in the street by NATO-backed and al-Qaedaaffiliated rebels on October 20, 2011.349 Shortly thereafter, many
of these rebels, refugees, and radical extremists (now armed with
military-grade weaponry and millions of dollars of gold pillaged
from the corpse of the Libyan state) poured across the borders into
neighboring states and Syria, further destabilizing the region.350
These known al-Qaeda-linked extremists were then given the
euphemism “moderate rebels” in Syria to obfuscate the fact the
United States was now collaborating with elements of the faction
that served as the initial enemy in The War on Terror (see Jake
Sullivan’s (b. 1976) 2011 email to then-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton (b. 1947) titled “AQ [al-Qaeda] is on our side”).351 This
framing of “moderate rebels” was a continuation of the Orwellian
language manipulation. This aggressive and violent regime change
is emblematic of the neoconservative shift in American foreign
policy for which Rumsfeld laid the groundwork. As a presidential
candidate, Obama was highly critical of the W. Bush
administration’s invasion of Iraq. However, once in office, thenPresident Obama’s critique softened and he refused to investigate
and prosecute key W. Bush administration officials for their
connection to possible war crimes, including Rumsfeld, as Ratner
and The Center for Constitutional Human Rights predicted would
be the case in 2008.352
Here, Obama’s criticisms of the United States war machine
ultimately worked to launch a continuation of W. Bush-era
neoconservative foreign policy, following the model set by the
Clinton administration. In fact, in 2003, Clinton’s United Nations
349
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ambassador Richard Holbrooke (1941–2010) consulted with the
W. Bush administration and claimed that the precedent set by the
Clinton administration’s unilateral invasion of Kosovo
demonstrated no need to bring the Iraqi case before the United
Nations.353 By 2011, Obama picked up where W. Bush-era
neoconservatives left off and the United States’ military operations
in the region expanded. Hedges summarized the phenomenon as
follows:
The dark reasoning of George W. Bush’s administration
was that the threat of terrorism and national security gave
the executive branch the right to ignore all legal restraints.
The Obama administration has made this disregard for law
bipartisan. Obama assured us when [the operations in
Libya] started that it was not about “regime change.” But
this promise proved as empty as the ones he made during
his presidential campaign. He has ruthlessly prosecuted the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where military planners
speak of a continued United States presence for the next
couple of decades. He has greatly expanded our proxy
wars, which rely heavily on drone and missile attacks, as
well as clandestine operations, in Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia and Libya. Add a few more countries and we will
set the entire region alight.354
This policy had little to do with Rumsfeld’s critiques. By the time
Rumsfeld’s pro-regime stance was published, then-Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton and critical NATO allies had already decided
on removing Gaddafi from power. The United States and NATO’s
claims that Operation Unified Protector was a humanitarian effort
to “protect civilians in Libya” was a farce. Instead, the NATO
alliance was motivated by political prestige, as well as economic
353
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motives laid bare in since-leaked or released emails from ranking
politicians in the Hilary Clinton circle.355
Furthermore, the United States and NATO coalition
ignored the commanding initiative to “protect civilians” entirely
when the civilians happened to be pro-Gaddafi.356 Just as the
Democrats adopted Orwellian doublespeak to name aggressive
military operations, they also took cues from the neoconservatives
on media manipulation. They propagated unverified “evidence”
that “Hitlerized” Gaddafi as Rumsfeld had done with Saddam and
H.W. Bush did directly to Saddam a decade before Rumsfeld’s
attempts. Hysterical news blurbs painted the picture of a Viagrariddled mass-raping genocidal force (later proven to be almost
entirely without merit) that fired on its people with advanced
aircraft.357 In an ultimate twist of bloody and depressing irony,
United States officials were later forced to admit that all reports of
pro-Gaddafi forces firing on unarmed civilians from aircraft could
not be proven.358 At the same time, multiple human rights
organizations documented evidence that NATO aircraft not only
killed scores of civilians in airstrikes but that at least two of these
strikes constituted a war crime.359 NATO craft fired and then
targeted the same spot again shortly after in an illegal maneuver
called a “double-tap” designed to kill civilian first responders
showcased in the widely publicized “Collateral Murder” video.360
This video published by Wikileaks, amongst other inconvenient
information is likely a major contributing factor to its founder’s,
Julian Assange (b. 1971), continued legally dubious detention that
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some, including the United Nations, consider torture itself.361
The Obama-era foreign policy, which hardly differed from
the previous administration, represented the systematic product of
the neoconservative shift away from the political realism of the
Kissinger-era (that still racked up its own body count across the
globe). Nonetheless, the rightward shift did not start with Obama.
The Clinton administration used their own spin on liberal
internationalism to justify military operations such as the spread of
democratic values, economic liberalization, and humanitarian
concern.362 This so-called liberal internationalism served as the
blueprint for the Obama administration and their NATO allies for
the justification of the regime-change operation in Libya and the
immediate expansion of The United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM) into the Central African Republic, Uganda, South
Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, announced just
days after Gaddafi’s death.363 The expose on Clinton and her inner
circle’s emails exposed the fact this was part of a neoliberal
scheme from the beginning. By Saturday, February 26, 2011, just
over ten days after the first stirrings began on February 15, 2011,
William J. Burns (b. 1956) emailed Sullivan, Alice Wells (b.
1963), and a redacted email address about a meeting he had with
French diplomat Jean-David Levitte (b. 1946).364 The email
emphasized the need for the United States to play a role in
“supporting pol [political] and econ [economic] change in the
361
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region” and that the United States and the European Union “should
coordinate ambitious approach to Maghreb, Egypt and perhaps
others on liberalized trade.”365
Rumsfeld and other neoconservatives advocated for
increased military and political intervention in the Middle East
long before it became a centerpiece of American policymaking. As
mentioned, the consequences of the destabilization of Libya only
brought more violence to the region, including Libya, which is still
teetering on the edge of crisis as of 2022.366 Furthermore, the
deception of the NATO allies at the United Nations included: an
explicit promise the purpose of the operation was not to institute a
regime change; used Qatari influence and propaganda machines to
manipulate the African Union and The League of Arab Nations;
violated the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973
which greenlit Operation Unified Protector and denied “a foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”
further alienating China and Russia.367 As permanent members of
the UNSC, either Russia or China could have vetoed the
resolution, however, both countries abstained or voted in favor
because they believed the NATO allies.368 China began to
condemn the operation shortly after it began and long before
Gaddafi was removed.369 Russia, which previously signaled some
willingness to work within the confines of international law and
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assisted the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, only became
more hostile on the world stage since 2011.
Scholars Geif Ulfstein (n.d.) and Hege Fosund (n.d.) claim,
at the very least, that the NATO operation in Libya severely
damaged the credibility of NATO in future crises.370 The continued
violence in the region and the damaged credibility of the United
States and NATO before the world stage are just some of the
continuing consequences of the neoconservative foreign policy
shift orchestrated by Rumsfeld and his allies over decades of
bellicose fearmongering and myth-building. The only winners in
the world they orchestrated are weapons contractors. In fact, as
defense company Palantir Technologies predicts, the RussianUkrainian War will boost profit margins for defense companies,
Jim Taiclet (the CEO of Lockheed Martin) was praised in
interviews on Face the Nation on May 8, 2022, for the weapons
Lockheed Martin produces.371
Defiant to the End
When Rumsfeld was not promoting his memoir or being asked for
his “expert” opinion on current United States foreign policy,
Rumsfeld was occasionally asked to defend his decisions in the W.
Bush administration. In one particularly confrontational interview
with Al-Jazeera in 2011, he revealed his staunch opposition to
taking any sort of accountability for the disastrous outcomes of the
wars in the Middle East and North Africa. First and foremost, he
370

Geir Ulfstein and Hege Fosund, “The Legality of the NATO bombing in
Libya,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 62, no. 1
(2013): 159-171, https://www-jstororg.libproxy.lib.csusb.edu/stable/43302692?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_content.
371
“Transcript: Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet on ‘Face the Nation,” CBS
News, May 8, 2022,
https://news.yahoo.com/transcript-lockheed-martin-ceo-jim153712487.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall. For more information, see: Chavi Mehta,
“Palantir Q2 revenue forecast below estimates; expects Ukraine war to boost
growth,” NASDAQ, May 9, 2022, https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/palantir-q2revenue-forecast-below-estimates-expects-ukraine-war-to-boost-growth.

369

In Memoriam

justified the war in Iraq because, in his view, it removed the “brutal
regime” of Saddam Hussein which ultimately made the world a
“better place.”372 When pressed by the reporter about how the war
and its aftermath improved the lives of Iraqis, Rumsfeld could only
resort to the knee-jerk response that Saddam was responsible for
more deaths than the United States was, as if this was to bring any
sort of solace to the many thousands of families who lost loved
ones at the hands of the United States-led war against their
country. Incredibly, Rumsfeld even cited Saddam’s use of
chemical weapons in the years before the United States invasion to
bolster his point of Saddam’s ruthlessness and brutality.373 Of
course, Rumsfeld played an integral role in establishing United
States relations with Iraq when Saddam used these weapons
against not only Iranians but also Iraqis. The reporter, privy to this
knowledge, challenged Rumsfeld on this point. Rumsfeld
simultaneously denied his involvement, as well as the United
States’ involvement, in the facilitation of Iraq’s chemical weapons,
yet he also claimed he was without knowledge and not in a
position to deny or validate the claim.374 Thus, Rumsfeld gave an
inherently contradictory and unbelievable response, given his
intimate involvement in relations with Iraq during this time.
Finally, when asked by the Al-Jazeera reporter if he would
“apologize to Iraqis” for his role in their devastation, Rumsfeld
became visibly agitated and responded with “of course not” and
said it was “the right decision” to invade claiming that the “people
of Iraq today are vastly better off.”375 It is in this interview that one
can see the essence of American exceptionalism, embodied by
Rumsfeld, who remained steadfast and defiant in the face of
criticism and accountability for his own, as well as his
government’s, calamitous actions around the world.
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In a final reflection on his life, Donald Rumsfeld proved to
be a significant and influential figure in American politics,
economics, and foreign policy over several decades. His rapid
ascent into the echelons of power during the Nixon and Ford years
served as an expression of the rise of neoconservatism—a political
ideology that Rumsfeld would become intimately tethered to
throughout his political life. Simultaneously, Rumsfeld’s frequent
shuffling between roles in both the private and public sector in the
decades after similarly served as an expression of the rise of
neoliberal capitalism, the ideology pioneered by Milton Friedman
who mentored Rumsfeld since his earliest days in politics. Then, in
his final act in government as the W. Bush administration’s
Secretary of Defense, he used his position to empower both
neoconservative foreign policy and neoliberal capitalist
profiteering in the spectacularly disastrous conflicts in the War on
Terror. Rumsfeld was not unique in his promotion of destructive
wars and unfettered capital, nor was his manipulation of the media
to sell the aggressive foreign policy. Yet, his life traces a definitive
history of the United States’ reliance on neoconservative foreign
policy and neoliberal capitalist profiteering as a means to maintain
its global dominance, to the extreme detriment of all those who are
caught in the crosshairs or continue to be born in the dust of
depleted uranium (Figure 2).376 Meanwhile, known war criminal
Donald Rumsfeld lived out the remainder of his days in peace, able
to falsely claim to his dying breath that all of these episodes of
military adventurism were purely motivated by innocent desires to
promote democracy and freedom around the world. And so, he was
simply allowed to live out the rest of his life in dignity and with
distinction regardless of the absolute terror his decisions wrought.
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Figure 2. Newborn with anencephaly, one of the leading birth defects that
rapidly increased following the United States’ use of depleted uranium in
Iraq.377 Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.378

“Donald Rumsfeld, killer of 400,000 people [some estimate
it to be 600,000 in Iraq alone by 2006, and 1,033,000 by
2007], dies peacefully.”
-
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“We died for oil, we died for borders
Killed for democracy, still believed every platform
Can you handle the death
Accept what we create together?
I still know every politician is a fucking monster…
History said we died for freedom
But today no justice was served…
Two world wars later
Countless military interventions
We erect monuments to history
And give apologies to the dead
All that was fought for the living is quickly forgotten
We don’t remember the dates
We don’t remember the reasons
We have no idea what’s going on
Building the histories of western corporations.”
-

Against Me! “Y’all Don’t Wanna Step to Dis.”380
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